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INLUCETUA
Sin and the Government
Events so jammed and overloaded with meaning
defy efforts to understand them by writing, yet it would
be difficult for a person concerned with both public life
and religion not to write about the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma. Our senses have been
assaulted with the shockwaves of sorrow from the images
of bloody babies and broken lives, the details as familiar
to us as the toys on our own playroom floors, the clothes
and papers and briefcases and chairs here strewn
around in such nightmare disdorder. What can be discerned in the images crowding our minds now, the tangled and improbable but all-too-real chaos of failed
structure?
A young friend sent an e-mail recently, asking what
I was thinking. He wanted some help for his spiritwhat sense could be made of this? how could his grief
for the victims he would never know be completed or
expressed? was he the only one concerned for the perpetrators? how could he even go out in the morning, filled
with such dread and sorrow? This editorial is a version
of what I wrote to him.
Making sense of it? At some level, such an aim is
reductive and trivializing, as though if we could simply
understand it, we could put the event away into its categories and then breathe easier. No doubt we will all, to
the extent that we hear the media voices, have it interpreted for us in any number of ways, some helpful and
some simply increasing the destructiveness. It certainly
ought to concern us that a number of our political leaders, moved by a laudable and fully understandable sympathy for the victims, seem ready to lessen the demands
and difficulties of maintaining th e freedoms we as
Americans have regarded as definitive and foundational.
It has never been clearer that the price of liberty is
high. The freedom of speech and the freedom to assemble-with those freedoms we have all agreed to accept a
risk, even bombings, even bombings of day care centers.
And it may be that we will decide that such a risk is unacceptable. But I hope it will also to be part of the public
discourse after the event, when the time of memorial
rhetoric has ended, to clarify the principle that to allow
any kind of speech is not to condone speech that is hateful and destructive. Much less to reward it, pay for it,
May 1995

praise it, and -heaven forgive us-enjoy it.
We are also given opportunity to consider our attitudes toward government. Government is far from
being the only entity which is today the object of distrust, scorn, abuse or hatred. Hating "government" or
"administration," or "unions" or "Hollywood" or even
"baseball" has become a new national pastime, but hating will surely nurture the poisonous effects in the soul
that these murderers finally acted on. This poisonous
stuff is, I suppose, what one would call "sin."
There. It has been said, and it is surprising how different things look once that word is in the air. Now
there can be a reason for seeking to place blame,
because there is really something wrong that has been
done, and now a process necessary for human wholeness
can begin. The process that Christians call repentence,
forgiveness, restoration. What seems to me so sad and
empty in the way the secular world meets this kind of sorrow is that the only recourse is legal retribution, as if that
process were really going to make anything better. It
doesn ' t, but we keep going through the same truncated
process anyway. The old Hebrew systems of justice which
many people love to use in support of retribution were
harsh but more merciful; they demanded the re-incorporation into community of the punished person-if minus an
eye or a tooth.
But we don't want anything to do with that difficult
element of the sin/ repentence / forgiveness/restoration
continuum; after the punishment, we don't want anything
to do with the mess. We continue to act as if punishing the
guilty were all that is needed to restore a wholeness so
dreadfully damaged. Surely Christian people must pray
for the perpetrators-both to desire that before God
they would repent and be forgiven, and also that there
will be comfort for the people who love them. I am
always haunted by the mothers of murderers, somehow.
Someone has to pray for them, and such prayer seems a
lonely task, one which it can be embarrassing even to
acknowledge. (I think this is one of the good things
about religious orders; they just keep praying on behalf
of all the things or people that need praying for, regardless of what anybody thinks.)
So I believe that restoring the word "sin" to our
3

vocabulary would help us to understand what has happened to all of us, and why we feel so affected by the specific and actual sorrow that has fallen most directly on
others. We are feeling the sin in the world. And it matters.
The sense of wholeness and its disruption has
other implications for the way we think of government.
The frenzy for "reducing government" tends to overlook
the fact that these reductions are about the good work
done by thousands of people who do government jobs.
The eagerness to cut back, reduce, downsize, re-structure and re-make government directly and immediately
affects how many social security staff workers? mail carriers? bailiffs in federal courts? day care center helpers in
the places where social security staff have their children
cared for? and so on and so on. One of the most pernicious of the effects of the enthusiasm for "cutting" and
"saving" on government is that it tends to cover from
our sight the fact that providing the services of government is the work of many thousands of people, our fellow citizens. And why should it not be? Is there
something sacred about making or shipping or selling
widgets that makes working for Amalgamated Widget
more wholesome or pleasing or positive than working
for the government or its-dreaded word-bureaucracy?
Certainly a sense of good stewardship of resources and
basic honesty demands that people who work for the
government should work hard, and produce good service for money, and deliver the mail or keep the
accounts or service clients without cheating or waste.
But government jobs are not in some way corrupt, an
evil we would be better off without.
The fatuous blather about "reducing the size of
government" can be understood as another in a long
stream of rationalizations for the fundamental human
desire to keep what we like to call "ours" or "mine." Let
me keep what is mine, I say, and I'll be happy. But too
many other people are implicated in the means by
which I have "made" what I like to call mine. So the
men who bombed the building have an extreme notion
that "the government" has injured them or their cause.

And the government will pay. What rhetoric about "government" has encouraged this ignorance about who and
what government is? Government is not some entity separated from the real life that we all live; it is embedded
in the choices we make about what to do with our lives
and money, and who we hire to carry out our will about
where that money-communally produced, whether or
not we can stand the concept-is used. To forget or
ignore this is to be partly crazed, de-ranged about right
relationships. And there are people-all over the political spectrum-who ought to know better than to foster
this kind of derangement.
What can you do? Recognize that God's goodness
is still potent and true. Pray for help and healing for
those who can be helped and healed. Recognize the
fragility of life and promise to foster and nurture it
wherever it is your option to do so. See that there is a
connection between this and the Jesus who had friends
in Bethany-and did strange things to show his concern
for them (I do not want to be understood to say, "God
does things like this to show us such and such .... "
Rather, only to point out that God acts in mysterious
ways in response to events that we find devastating. As
C.S.Lewis says of Asian in one of the Narnia tales, "He's
not a tame lion, you know.")
Grieve too, because sorrow for others is a better
thing than blame or curiosity or voyeurism or gawking.
Make an offering to God of your sorrow and grief and
anger, because that is what you have now to offer up.
And going out in the morning? Well, that is what
humans are framed to do-and if we did it in the old
Jewish way, we would go out with the word of God
bound over our foreheads to remind us that our being
in the world only makes sense when we perceive God's
creative energy and love as our context.
The world, like this month's cover painting, often
strikes us as a nearly unintelligible jumble. And bloody,
where we do perceive anything at all. Pray for the
strength to trust in the goodness of God. The picture
insists on the reality of the feast, even if that reality is yet
to come.
Peace,
GME
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COMMENCING TO TELL THE TRUTH
Christa Klein
Your first distinction, graduates, is to finish your
degree between the times. You may be a remnant of the
class of 1994 or a forerunner of the class of 1995. And,
you may or may not have some certainty about the next
phase of your life. Graduations are strange times. I am
pleased that this university does not let you slip away, but
recognizes you publicly at the time you have ended your
course. Finishing between the times could all too easily
be a non-event leaving you on your own to celebrate its
significance, or requiring you to wait until spring when
the immediate links to your hard work and to this place
already would have been broken.
I speak from experience. I finished my doctorate in
December and remember waiting to sense the significance. I was eight months pregnant with our second
child, six years with my dissertation, when on a cold and
wet morning eighteen years ago, carrying a suitcase full of
copies, I frantically hailed a taxi cab on Lexington Avenue
in Manhattan. After clarifying with the cab driver that
Penn Station and not the nearest maternity ward was our
destination, the journey was uneventful. An Amtrak
Metroliner got me to Philadelphia. I found the right
office, despite its relocation since the beginning of my
degree work several years earlier. And there I sat watching the staff member who wore a red rubber finger tip go
through the top right comer of each page of my dissertation to confirm, first, that I had submitted all the pages;
and second that they were in order. So went my
December graduation, a non-event marking the end of
my most strenuous intellectual activity to date. A whimper, not a bang.
Christa Klein is an independent scholar and church historian
in York, Pennsylvania. She is on the Board of Directors of VU,
and gave this speech at the commencement ceremony held here in
December of 1994. The author is grateful to Paul R Hinlicky,
Evangelical Faculty, Commenius University, Bratislava,
Slovakia, for several conversations about the virtue of
truthtelling.
May 1995

We often wait for significance. We are not very
good at bestowing it on ourselves. In fact waiting for significance may be the curse of living in a culture that values autonomous achievement as much as ours does. All
too often we are left alone to discern the meaning of our
achievements, no less our mistakes and failures. There is
too little community.
No surprise then that the imaginary world of the
arts and entertainment couples individuals when it
engages in social commentary. In that world, we are not
alone but have sidekicks who wait with us for significance.
Consider for example, Calvin and Hobbes, Ren and
Stimpy, Beavis and Butthead, Wayne and Garth, or, in the
rarer display of female camaraderie, Thelma and Louise.
These dynamic duos are often caught in the act of waiting
for something to happen, or trying to precipitate it,
because of their experience with insignificance.
Boredom, if not abuse and stupidity, defines the existence
they fight. They search for excitement: the ultimate sled
ride, fire explosion, successful exercise of body functions,
any thrill to pass the time.
All, in all, they wait, periodically turning on each
other or making the inconsequential into elaborate ritual.
These partners are the popular descendants of Estragon
and Vladimir from Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot.
Meaning does not feel very significant when we have to
bestow it ourselves. We might as well tum to a companion and, mocking our sense of insignificance, berate
everyone else as well.
Nevertheless, this cynicism is but one side of the
popular analysis. It is matched, as it always has been, by
an equally powerful sentimentality. Consider the contemporary manipulation of TV audiences in situation comedies. Not only are there cues when to laugh or clap, but
also when to sigh meaningfully. Or note how frequently
news reporters inflict the "how do you feel" upon people
suffering tragedy. If we had any doubt that sentiments
were not being scripted, we might turn to the racks of
5

greeting cards in supermarkets, drug stores, bookstores,
and airports. In sentimentality we often settle for pseudocommunity.
I wish I could say that this formal education you
have completed and that we celebrate today guarantees
that you will be able to bestow proper significance upon
the events of your own and others' lives. While an education may help you enjoy the partial truths in both the cynical and the sentimental, and even the value of mockingly
bad taste, there are no guarantees that education per se
will break down the isolation that is at the root of these
cultural realities. People with college degrees are likely
behind the creation and business success of the characters and practices I have described.
In fact, the process of education all too often heightens rather than assuages our sense of isolation and our
cultural fragility. Even though Valparaiso is now a far less
homogeneous and protective university than it was in my
undergraduate days, the current cultural emphasis on taking the world's measure through the sieve of personal
experience has probably made learning harder work. For
all our hopes and even platitudes about diversity and
globalizing, we are finding it harder to meet and take seriously the other, the stranger, when so much emphasis is
placed on the truth of our own personal experience. We
end up acknowledging, even honoring, differences as separate truths. Rarely do we show enough respect to engage
them.
Emphasis on the personal is a mixed blessing.
Certainly in these days we are better able to recognize the
power of formative experiences, both positive and negative, in our lives. Nevertheless, the culture of the educated is tempting us to end the narrative right there and
build shrines to those old truths about ourselves. In so
doing, we may end up looking backwards, victimized by
our pasts.
This same culture tempts us to view ourselves as rare
orchids, requiring the hothouse of the like-minded to survive. It is as if gender, age, racial, national and social
class identities are each housed in different parts of the
human nursery. The mysteries of difference become all
the more unfathomable as the culture of the educated
encourages our isolation.
Irony of ironies, all this insularity and false community is culturally taught, not freely preferred. Such cultivated narrowness, where it exists, will not help you in the
tasks that lie ahead, but does signal much about your calling as university graduates. However necessary the task of
self-healing and · however comforting the community of
the like-minded, you are needed for something more.
You are called to join the on-going creation of the world.
My generation from the 1960s misconstrued that call and
6

thought that it meant simply the reform of already existing organizations. We did not recognize that organizations are made up of regular and historic patterns of
human interchange that require constant tending. We
did not understand and did not want to be responsible
for the unintended consequences of reform that did not
take into account these undergirding human institutions.
The on-going creation of the world requires well
considered attention to the building blocks of human
interaction and creativity at the most basic levels: in
friendship and marriage, in congregations and neighborhoods. I speak of the places where the presence of the
other must be acknowledged and a common life forged
so that human beings know who they are, value their gifts,
and understand their shared responsibilities and the limitations to their own autonomy. These building blocks of
human culture can no longer be taken for granted. Their
distortion blinds us to our need for them and erodes the
institutions that depend on them in the public, the private and the voluntary sectors-the sectors where you will
be at work.
Before his death last year, Christopher Lasch along
with Cornell West, two among our more thoughtful public philosophers, shared their deep concern about the
break-down in nurturing systems for children. Children,
they said, are becoming culturally naked, and will be
unable to navigate the inevitable trauma and tragedy of
human life because they have not been formed with the
cultural resources that transmit meaning, or value, dignity
or decency, elegance or excellence. Neither cynicism nor
sentimentalism are any match for the tasks that lie ahead.
We cannot take our institutions for granted.
Your calling will require the exercise of certain
virtues, especially truth telling. A university education can
help you with that task. You have been working at the
analytic skills in your field or profession that are necessary
tools. Yet, such skills will hardly be enough. Self-deception and culturally induced rationalization will be ever
present. Moreover, there are great difficulties in moving
organizations to a reflective and learning stance. To get
theological about it, there is this human perchant for
playing God with merely human capabilities.
A great temptation will be to want to tell the truth to
hurt, to destroy and to damn. Certainly my generation
was so tempted. The purpose of truth-telling as a virtue is
not always easy to discern. Certainly it allows individuals
to pursue ethical integrity, that is, to lay down their lives
for what they believe to be true. But such acts of ethical
integrity, vital as they are, cannot in themselves heal broken institutions.
It is good that we celebrate your achievements today
in this chapel where we are dwarfed by brick, glass and
The Cresset

steel and captive to images that push us beyond ourselves.
The vision undergirding this university and its work
derives from a tradition that recognizes and values, but
does not settle for human approximations of truth or
even for acts of ethical integrity. The saving act of this triune God was to use truth to judge, but not to destroy the
world, rather to forgive , heal and renew it. This place
honors a God who chose not to make his promises to a
perfect, moral people, but to a ragtag group of disloyal
Hebrew nomads and who himself chose to enter human
history as a helpless child. In the incarnation, we see that
we are not abandoned, alone, isolated, forgotten. In the
death and resurrection of that Bethlehem child we know
that our end and the inevitable faults and failures of our
institutions will not be the last word on us or the world we
work to create.
If this truth envelops the truths seen but partially in

these in-between times, then you as graduates are empowered to work for the on-going creation of the world in
human institutions without either false idealism or debilitating despair. You are freed to question your own wisdom, even as you question the judgement of others. You
are freed to learn from mistakes and unintended consequences as well as from successes and achievements. You
are freed not to fear the truth, but to revel in the unfathomable truths of God's love for each of you and for this
creation.
Go out from this place with joy in creation. Take
your place in human history. Be passionate and liberal in
exploring your gifts. Join others-even join governing
boards-and tend institutions. And live in the hope that
your efforts are desperately needed, but will not be the
last word. God alone, out of love, promises to bring
human creation to fulfillment. 0

Girl at Sewing Machine
-after the painting f7y Edward Hopper
Terra cotta walls are busy growing
light from the afternoon. The Singer's pump
aches with each step, its cast iron conjuring
the many parts whole. Again
the seams are asked to expand,
to accommodate the child who draws
closer to a separate life.
(Two become one to make three
in the old mathematic oflonging.)
As the window's shadow indents a sign
of the cross, she mends in time
what she can. Her wounds from the needle
close towards wholeness, to recover a sense
of touching without pain. In the space
between what if and what is,
she dreams of the coming spring:
"Swallows will be light
as song. I will be heavy
as sin, my child's questions
an endless spool of why."

Terry Fugate

M ay 1995
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MR. NEO-ANGULAR: c.s. LEWIS'S T.S. ELIOT
Michael Larson

Until very late in his life, C.S.Lewis did not like
T.S.Eliot. It occurs to me that this is a significant fact,
considering Lewis is one of the major critics of the twentieth century and Eliot is one of the major poets of the
same. And it is not just the poetry that Lewis did not like.
He had little tolerance for Eliot's criticism and probably
even less for his overall philosophy despite the fact that it
included, like Lewis's own, the embracing of Christianity.
Other similarities between the two men are that both
were born in the late nineteenth century (Eliot, 1888;
Lewis, 1898), both lived most of their lives in England
(though Eliot's early years were in the United States and
Lewis's were in Ireland), both received classical educations (Eliot at Harvard, Lewis at Oxford), both majored
in philosophy as undergraduates, both wrote poetry
(though Eliot's is more widely respected), both wrote literary criticism (though Lewis's is more widely respected),
and both were devout Anglicans for the majority of their
lives.
On the surface it seems that these men could have
been friends, or at least not enemies. The ill feelings
between them were more clearly and more regularly
communicated by Lewis, but the overwelming question is
Why? Why did Lewis want to pick on Eliot? Was he looking for someone with a big, yet easily assailable, reputation on which to cut his critical eye teeth (easy, at least,
for an intellect as genuinely learned as Lewis's)? Was he
jealous that Eliot's modernist poetry met with more public and critical success than his own rather Georgian
poetry? Was it even Eliot in particular or was it the whole
modernist movement in general which Lewis found so
unpalatable-Eliot having the misfortune of being perhaps the most obvious literary target of the movement?

Mike Larson lives with his wife and daughter in Owatonna,
Minnesota, where he writes and plays chess. His poetry and fiction have appeared in a variety of magazines.
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Perhaps all of these have at least something to do with
Lewis's attack of Eliot, but instead of focusing on Lewis's
motivation, I propose simply to examine what he said
and wrote about Eliot; and we may, in the process, learn
something of the motivation as well, which has infinitely
more to do with the public voice of Eliot than with the
private frustrations of Lewis. The world has learned
much from Lewis's diverse analyses. It seems likely that
we can learn something from his views on Eliot's philosophy, criticism, and poetry as well. I will turn now to those
views in that order, and I will conclude with a look at the
minimal, yet revealing, personal encounters between the
two men.
In 1933 Lewis published an allegorical novel, The
Pilgrim's Regress, in which a character, Mr. Neo-Angular (a
thinly disguised Eliot), is one of many characters who
tries to deprive the story's hero of the true object of his
search, which is, to oversimplify, true Christianity. In a
letter to a friend, Lewis says:
What I am attacking in Neo-Angular is a set of people who
seem to me ... to be trying to make of Christianity itself
one more highbrow, Chelsea, bourgeois-baiting fad ... T.S.
Eliot is the single man who sums up the thing I am fighting
against. (Green and Hooper 130)

This statement is not about the high-church/low
church/broad church schism within Anglicanism.
Rather it is about the way Lewis perceives Eliot to be presenting Christianity in general. Somehow he has reached
the conclusion that Eliot is making Christianity fashionable, in the worst sense of the word, that a certain elitist
audience is becoming attracted to Christianity not necessarily because it is true or because their souls crave it but
because a certain elitist poet is making it into a sort of
self-congratulatory club.
Because of this perception, Lewis thinks Eliot's
brand of Christianity to be completely lacking in emotion
The Cresset

(Carpenter 53). The converts, starting with Eliot himself,
must be entering through the doors of intellectual delusion: We've read the classics. We know Shakespeare, We
understand Eliot. We're enlightened Christians. Lewis, we
can be sure, is all for enlightenment, especially within
Christendom, but not when it becomes a thing to be conscious of in itself and in fact is the rite of entrance into
the club.
This emphasis on the intellectual at the expense of
the emotional and the sensual, in regard to the faith, is
closely related to the gnostic problem within Christianity.
Gnosis means knowledge, and in gnostic heresies, the
individual is saved by acquiring the correct knowledge,
an enlightenment: namely that the flesh is eternally evil
or soiled and that the soul is eternally good or pure, that
this life is a sort of temporal defilement but that the
chained, though unstained, spirit will return to God
when it is set free through death (Guitton 51-75). Lewis,
I am sure, would not go so far as to accuse Eliot of gnostic heresy, but would quite possibly characterize Eliot's
asceticism as an unwitting response to the undercurrent
of gnostic thinking which is always present within the
Church. In fact, Corbin Carnell, in Bright Shadow of
Reality, contrasts the philosophies of Eliot and Lewis, suggesting that the earlier work of Eliot is actually more
Buddhist in its orientation than Christian. Lewis and
orthodox Christianity would reject the notion that man
can, or even should, divorce himself from the pleasures
of the physical world. The concept of grace must apply
to the whole man, matter and spirit inextrically entwined
(130). It is interesting to note that Lewis uses one of
Eliot's favorite writers, St. John of the Cross, to illustrate
this idea in Arthurian Torso, saying that even the great
saint "towards the end was encouraged to remember that
he liked asparagus" ( 175).
It seems possible that the early Eliot, eager to
reform the world, believes everyone might have something to gain by living the life of an ascetic monk. The
problem with that, as Lewis might see it, is that the people must have a positive reason for living in such a manner. A true monk deprives himself of the world for the
sake of the world. An ideal Eliotic convert seeks deprivation out of the "knowledge" that too much association
with the world, by very nature of it, will destroy him in
the end. This last motivation for asceticism leads to two
things which are contrary to orthodox Christianity: condemnation of the more tangible portion of creation, and
pride on the part of the ascetic for his apparent ability to
transcend the world by despising it. In Christianity by
contrast, God enters the world through the Incarnation,
which is the irreversible marriage of spirit and matter.
So the pre-Christian Eliot, and even Eliot the
Anglican, is a bit austere, even by Christian standards, in
his view of religious life. This is not to say that his
extremism does not have its roots in Christian teaching.
May 1995

There is quite clearly a theology of the denial of self within Christianity, but Lewis would likely argue for balance
in this theology, that there is indeed much we ought to
deny ourselves but that there is also much in creation we
ought gratefully to enjoy. Consequently, Eliot's writing is
far less sensual than Lewis's (Carnell 130), and this is a
distinction which concerns Lewis very much, given Eliot's
substantial audience.
If there is a point at which Lewis and Eliot agree
philosophically, it is where that philosophy comes to bear
on criticism. As critics, both would readily agree that the
individual poet must not give himself over completely to
the world of sensation-divorced from philosophy, theology, etc. (Carnell 153). In this, Lewis would agree with
all the Counter-Romantics, of which Eliot is a strong
voice. But there the agreement stops. Lewis argues passionately for the romantic notion that the imagination is
indeed a vital truth-bearing faculty, "though not quite as
the romantics understood it" (Green and Hooper 126).
And he will rise to the defense of the romantics whenever
one of their tormentors speaks out unjustly. In
Rehabilitations and Other Essays, Lewis tries to call a halt to
the Shelley-bashing of the Counter-Romantics by taking
issue with Eliot's assertion that Dryden is a more classical
poet than Shelley. Lewis, while conceding Shelley's
faults, systematically shows how, by Eliot's own criteria,
Shelley is in fact a more classical poet than Dryden (334). In his defense of Shelley, Lewis manages to get in a
more personal swipe at Eliot as well: "Mr. Eliot himself is
too experienced a writer to be guilty of the delusion that
he could write like Shelley if he chose; but I think many
of Mr. Eliot's readers may suffer from it"(22) .
This is one of many direct attacks by Lewis on
Eliot's criticism. In an essay from another book, They
Asked for a Paper, Lewis is baffled by Eliot's and other
modern critics' assertion that Hamlet is an artistic failure
on the grounds that it does not give us the motivation for
Hamlet's procrastination. He states:
The method of the whole play is much nearer to Mr. Eliot's
own method in poetry than Mr. Eliot suspects. Its true hero
is man-haunted man-man with his mind on the frontier
of two worlds, man unable either quite to reject or quite
admit the supernatural, man struggling to get something
done as man has struggled from the beginning, yet
incapable of achievement because of his inability to
understand either himself or his fellows or the real quality
of the universe which has produced him. (68)

Besides being an astute observation of both Hamlet and
the anti-heroes of Eliot's poetry, this statement is a typical
example of Lewis using something of Eliot's own against
him to point out his erroneous thinking. When Eliot
states, in Selected Prose ... , "more people have thought
Hamlet a work of art because they found it interesting,
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than have found it interesting because it is a work of art"
(4 7), Lewis is quick to suggest that Eliot is very near the
truth, that a work of art must indeed be, above all else,
interesting, and that Hamlet never disappoints us in that
regard (Lewis 69).
Another example of Lewis exposing a contradiction
in Eliot's criticism is in regard to the latter's thoughts on
Dante. Both Lewis and Eliot are great admirers of Dante.
In fact, in Rehabilitations and Other Essays, Lewis readily
agrees with Eliot that the final canto of the Paradiso is the
highest and best poetry ever written (27). But in The
Personal Heresy, Lewis reports that Eliot's statement that
"the rage of Dante ... the deep surge of Shakespeare's
general cynicism and disillusionment, are merely gigantic
attempts to metamorphose private failures and disappointments" (3). This is the kind of "personal heresy"
both in the criticism and in the writing of poetry that
Lewis condemns in his book-length debate with E. M. W.
Tillyard. What is interesting about the Eliot citation is
that it appears to violate the impersonal poetics put forth
in the Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot (37-44), of which Lewis
must certainly have been aware. It is true that in that
particular essay Eliot is focusing more on the composing
of poetry than the criticism of it. And to that extent,
Lewis and Eliot would agree that poetry ought not to be
the expression of the poet's personality. But Lewis would
argue that if this is so, then it is perhaps even more essential in criticism that we do not attribute great poetry to
some personal struggle of the poet, as Eliot does in the
above statement. Lewis, in typical confrontive fashion,
tried to publish his essay, "The Personal Heresy in
Poetics," in The Criterion; but Eliot, after many months of
deliberation, rejected it (Green and Hooper 126).
In The Personal Heresy, Tillyard suggests about Eliot's
then most recent work, 'The Rock," that the poetry is
best when it is most recognizably Eliot, when his personality shows most clearly through (36-37). Lewis, on the
contrary, states that if the poetry is good at all it is not
because we see the poet's personality shining through.
That would in fact carry us out of the realm of poetics
and into. the trap of having to consider Eliot as a fellow
creature in a particular social milieu, which induces
inevitable judgments fatal to the true reception of poety
(63-64).
Though we can see Lewis collides with Eliot's critcism on several fronts, the most violent of these collisions
concerns Milton. In addition to stating that the verse of
Milton has a "bad influence" on subsequent verse and on
the English language in general, the original Milton
essay by Eliot, "A Note on the Verse of John Milton,"
makes the embarrassingly bald implication that the best
judges of Milton's poetry or any other poetry are in fact
those who are also the best contemporary poets. Lewis
licked his lips and wrote A Preface to Paradise Lost, in
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which the second chapter is devoted to refuting Eliot's
ridiculous assertion and thereby reestablishing the rights
of Lewis and other mere critics to comment on Paradise
Lost (9-12). He proceeds to comment for another 125
pages and returns to Eliot for the close of the book,
where we are reminded of a fundamental philosophical
difference between the two men:
If Mr. Eliot disdains the eagles and trumpets of epic poetry
because the fashion of this world passes away, I honour
him. But if he goes on to draw the conclusion that all
poetry should have the penitential qualities of his own best
work, I believe he is mistaken. As long as we live in merry
middle earth it is necessary to have middle things. If the
round table is abolished, for every one who rises to the level
of Galahad, a hundred will drop plumb down to that of
Mordred. Mr. Eliot may succeed in persuading the youth
of England to have done with robes of purple and
pavements of marble. But he will not therefore find them
walking in sackcloth on floors of mud-he will only find
them in smart, ugly suits walking on rubberoid. It has been
tried before. The older Puritans took away the maypoles
and the mince pies: but they did not bring in the
millennium, they only brought in the Restoration. Galahad
must not make common cause with Mordred, for it is always
Mordred who gains, and he who loses, by such alliance.
(137)

If Lewis is unreasonably harsh with Eliot's criticism
(though I am not neccessarily suggesting that he is), he is
less so in regard to Eliot's poetry, although he could
never quite come to respect modern poetry as being on a
par with the best traditional verse. He felt that Eliot,
Pound and the rest of the moderns were throwing away
rhyme and meter and nature as reliable sources of
imagery (Griffin 13). And he did not like the obscure
images modern poetry produced. The title and first stanza of the first poem in C.S. Lewis: Poems is as follows:
A Confession

For twenty years I've stared my level best
To see if evening-any evening-would suggest
A patient etherized upon a table;
In vain. I simply wasn't able.
To me each evening looked far more
Like the departure from a silent, yet a crowded, shore
Of a ship whose freight was everything, leaving behind
Gracefully, finally, without farewells, marooned mankind.
(Hooper 1)
Lewis perceived the abandonment of form, in favor
of more avant-garde techniques of composition, as a natural step towards formlessness which would inevitably lead
to matterlessness as well. In a 1933 address to the Martlets
at Oxford, Lewis says of modern literature words to the
effect that the technique has become more important
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than the matter and that the result is "indeed a wasteland" (Keefe 56). And in Rehabilitations . .. he wonders
idly, "whether it is possible to distinguish poetry about
squalor and chaos from squalid and chaotic poetry" (21).
Of course he would say it is possible-he could probably
point to some of his own verse for examples-but he
would no doubt accuse Eliot of sometimes making the
poetry itself as unintelligible as its subject. This in fact
was his sentiment toward an unspecified Eliot poem
which Lewis was reading aloud at one of the famed
Inklings meetings (at which Lewis, Tolkien, Charles
Williams, and others met informally for literary discussion), but could not finish reading because the urge to
attack its lack of coherence was too strong. Others present defended the poem, and evidently a good laugh was
had by all (Green and Hooper 157).
I do not think Lewis was ever really malicious
toward Eliot. It seems rather that Eliot simply provided a
good source for a sort of British intellectual jocularity
confounded by the ambiguity in Eliot's poetry, but
toward the end of his career, Lewis at least takes a more
neutral stance in regard to the quality. In his Inaugural
Lecture at Cambridge in 1954 (included in They Asked for
a Paper), Lewis remarks about a recent symposium held
on Eliot's "Cooking Egg":
Here we find seven adults (two of them Cambridge men)
whose lives have been specially devoted to the study of
poetry discussing a very short peom which has been before
the world for thirty-odd years; and there is not the slightest
agreement among them as to what, in any sense of the
word, it means. I am not in the least concerned to decide
whether this state of affairs is a good thing, or a bad thing.
I merely assert that it is a new thing. (19)
Chances are, Lewis thought it was a bad thing as
well, but he became increasingly reticent about this issue
in his later years. And while he may always have been
frustrated by certain aspects of Eliot's poetry, he also
seemed always to have a strange admiration for it. In his
hallmark work, Allegory of Love, he suggests that Eliot is
the one modern writer whose depiction of evil is as thorough and intense as Deguileville's darkest work; and
there is a further implication that this depiction is a truer
one than either Milton's or Dante's hell, which might
almost be described as noble (271).
But Lewis's greatest praise for Eliot comes, ironically enough, in The Personal Heresy, the same book which
rather directly attacks Eliot's style of criticism. In it he
writes:
I must admit that there are also poems which seem to give
me a new and nameless sensation, or even a new sense, to
enrich me with experience which nothing in my previous
life had perpared me for ... I do not find it in Homer,
Sophocles, Chaucer, Spenser, Milton, or ... in Racine:
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find it seldom in Virgil, and only in the very latest works of
Shakespeare; but I find it abundantly in Blake, in the early
Morris, in Mr. De Ia Mare and Miss Sitwell, in Mr. Eliot, and
even in Poe. I find it most of all in the prose work of
George MacDonald .. . (102-103)
It is the last name in this list which makes Eliot's inclusion the highest compliment Lewis could pay him. Lewis
greatly admired MacDonald's work and openly refers to
him as his master in the preface to George MacDonald: An
Anthology (xxxii). But with equal candor, Lewis explains,
in The Personal Heresy, that MacDonald's prose style leaves
much to be desired (103). It is something other than the
technical grace (or lack thereof) which arouses the
response Lewis describes above. And whatever that
something other is (probably the artful suggestion of an
immanent supernatural order), he finds it "abundantly"
in Eliot.
Eliot's poetry may have been difficult medicine for
Lewis from the very beginning. When he was a mere
undergraduate, his fellow classmates were already enamoured with the author of "Prufrock" (Carpenter 12).
And the fanfare only increased over the years. In They
Asked for a Paper, Lewis clearly acknowledges the significant influence Eliot has had on modern English verse
(39), but it is probably not without some regret that he
makes such an acknowledgment. Eliot and the moderns
were not going away. And even if the rest of the world
had, with Lewis, rejected them, it seems as though some
quality of Eliot's poetry was going to linger in Lewis's
mind regardless of all his attempts to dismiss it.
Lewis's interactions, or near interactions, with Eliot
went from purely antagonistic to genuinely amiable over
the course of about forty years. In the mid 20s, Lewis
and a few of his friends wrote up some mock Eliotic
poems which were to be submitted, under pseudonyms,
to the Criterion. In the end their interest in the prank fizzled, and they did not send the poems (Green and
Hooper 88-89); but the episode clearly indicates Lewis's
profound, early disdain for Eliot's poetry, and it was the
precursor to an attack that lasted for more than two
decades.
Even by the mid 40s, though, Lewis and Eliot had
still not met face to face. A mutual friend of theirs,
Charles Williams, found Lewis's dislike of Eliot humorous and arranged for the two of them to finally meet over
tea. Eliot's first comment was, "Mr. Lewis, you are a
much older man than you appear in photographs." No
one knows what possessed him. Perhaps this was an
Eliotic jibe in return for twenty years of open criticism.
Lewis said nothing. Eliot tried again: "I must tell you,
Mr. Lewis, that I consider your Preface to Paradise Lost
your best book." But given Eliot's introductory statement
and the fact that Preface ... was the very book which
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made Eliot look rather silly, Lewis could not take the
comment seriously (223-224). But in a 1947 lecture,
which later bacame the essay, "Milton II," Eliot does mention the twelfth chapter of Lewis's book objectively, and
he withdraws his claim that only good contemporary
poets can be the judges of poetry (Christopher 41).
Mter the infamous tea, in Lewis's notebook there is the
entry, "Mr. Eliot has asked me not to write about his literary criticism. Very well. I obey" (Green and Hooper
224).

As unsuccessful as the tea was, it does mark a turning point in Lewis's treatment of Eliot. He started limiting his comments about Eliot to the poetry and even
made some civilized overtures toward him. Mter Charles
Williams's death, Lewis invited Eliot to contribute an
essay to the book he was putting together: Essays
Presented to Charles Williams (Griffin 24 7). Evidently Eliot
declined, as no essay written by him appears in the book.
Another near encounter between them was again in the
late 40s when they, along with a few others, almost coedited a new literary magazine which never materialized
but was supposed to have been a conservative counter to
the modernist magazine, Horizon. It is said that Eliot was
riding the fence with this proposition (Green and
Hooper 153), presumably because he had conservative
values but wrote modern verse.
It was not until the late 50s that Eliot and Lewis
finally got together again, not for tea but as members of
a committee of seven individuals selected to revise the
Psalms as they appeared in the Book of Common Prayer
(287-288). Lewis was extremely reticent about this particular project and about his consequent association with
Eliot. But a student of Lewis's at the time reports:
T.S. Eliot's work he greatly admired. He was once on a
committee with Eliot to revise the translation of the Psalms
and referred to himself, in comparison with Eliot, as a
"Whippersnapper" ... (Como 50)

And shortly after work on the Psalms had begun, Lewis
and his wife had lunch with Eliot and his new wife. The
encounter is desoribed as pleasant (Carpenter 272). A
pleasant lunch? A whippersnapper? This is not the
Lewis of old, the Counter-Counter-Romanticist, the great
enemy of the moderns and the sharp thorn in Eliot's
flesh. But it might well be that this is not the Eliot of old
either. With a happy marriage at last, it may be that the
fragmented voice of the doomsday ascetic is gone for
good.
One question haunts me. In the early years,
when Lewis was attacking on all fronts, why did Eliot not
defend himself? Why the strange silence in response to
Lewis's daunting invitation to debate? Was it because
Eliot was trying to be a gentleman and not stoop to argu12
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ment? I think not, since he willingly takes on numerous
other critics in his prose. Was it because he thought
Lewis was always right, and the criticism was therefore
easy to accept? Certainly not! No, if I had to venture a
guess in the matter, I would say that Eliot, in his consummate dramatic awareness of his own role in life, wanted
nothing whatsoever of an argument with Lewis, an experience which even the likes of Owen Barfield suggests is
rather like "wielding a peashooter against a howitzer"
(xx). It is much better indeed to wait for Lewis to grow
old and tired, and to become friends with him at last. Q
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JUSTICE, JUSTIFICATION, AND THE
UNIVERSITY'S TASK
Roy J. Enquist
It is a singular honor to be invited to come and talk
with you about your work in this new University of
Namibia. I am sure that most of us are aware that probably no institution created by this nation is in a position to
have a more profound impact on our common future
than this community of scholars here in the nation's
capitol. This is not academic hylms. It is actually deeply
humbling. For if knowledge is power, and if information
is access to power, then those institutions dedicated to
the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge are critically
significant. Show me a nation with poor schools, with no
respect for higher learning, and I'll show you a nation in
which freedom, human dignity, access to advancement,
and perhaps even hope itself will seem hollow words
impotent to evoke sustained belief. Of course, more
than education is needed to support a people-or individual-for life's long haul. But our major religious communities (concerning which I wish to speak today) have
over many centuries regarded human learning as indispensable. Seminal scholars such as Philo of Alexandria
in Egypt, and Thomas Aquinas in Italy, and Martin
Luther in Germany could agree on this: to be a person
of faith one would need to know the literature and history of faith in significant measure. So still today the synagogue is a school. And the modem university, if it is not
wholly given over to amnesia, recalls its origins in the
West as a child of the medieval church where, at length,
the Reformation too was born.
The story goes on. Since the University of Namibia
has chosen to establish a Department of Theology and
Religion it inherits this multiform legacy. The existence
of the department signals that the university is no
Roy Enquist is a member of the faculty of the Lutheran
Theological Seminary at Gettysburg. He has taught at the
University of Namibia and at Paulinum Lutheran Seminary in
that country. We are pleased to present to this wider audience the
university lecture he gave marking the opening of a Department
of Theology and Religion at the University of Namibia.
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idiosyncratic experiment in political manipulation. The
very presence of the department is a sign that this new
academic community intends to contribute to the
nation's own eager participation in an historical and
global culture. You have much to give, not only to your
own people, but to the world of learning generally. This
university is destined to be a window to the world at
large, and to the past, and to those adventures the twentieth century may yet have in store for us.
All this, I'm afraid, sounds much more sanguine
than I intended. Many problems of detail are deeply
troubling. For while religious studies pursued in the university community are at least as venerable as the university itself, at the end of the twentieth century, much of
university and religious life has become deeply conflicted.
What is most obvious is, for a change, the most
important. Advocates for secularization and fanaticism
are, for quite different reasons, clear that respect for academic freedom and religious devotion can be no longer
tolerated. The so-called warfare between science and
religion in nineteenth century European-American culture provided much of the rationale for banishing theological studies from the faculties of many of the new
public universities. This was both ironic and illinformed, for in fact it was the theological faculties of the
older universities in many countries, perhaps most
notably in Germany and then in Britain and the United
States, who worked most eagerly-and one must say brilliantly-to reconstruct their disciplines in the light of the
new work reshaping the natural and social sciences, and
philosophy. My impression (which may not be fully accurate) is that much of this old hostility-though not all-is
now in abeyance. In the United States, for example, we
have public universities that have strong departments of
religious studies. Many departments of philosophy generally are still quite hostile to theological studies but the
social sciences, ranging from political science to psychology, have increasingly found it necessary to deal with reli13

gion with the seriousness that its cultural impact would
suggest as appropriate. For example, does ignorance of
Islam enable us to understand Iran and Iraq better?
Does ignorance of Hinduism make India more comprehensible? Why does religion remain so peiVasive in officially secular America? Can the United States be
understood apart from its often flawed but stubborn aspiration to be "one nation under God with liberty and justice for all?" For most Americans, the problem with the
pledge is not its "God-talk," it's the elusive if not impossible dream actually to deliver liberty and justice both,
mind you, to all. And of course there are always literature and music and the other arts which continue to find
what we might call "human expressions of spirituality"
endlessly fascinatingly and culturally inevitable. But even
granting all this, the suspicion that the university in the
future will need to terminate theology's tenure is still
with us.
The other enemy of the ancient legacy which connects learning and religion gets more attention. True,
men such as Comte, Marx, and Bonhoeffer thought that
they could see the day when religion would largely disappear from culture. Secularization would ironically
appear as some new deus ex machina, irresistibly triumphing over religion. The twilight of the gods, the
Gotterdammerung would be upon us. Well, it hasn't happened. Indeed, the resurgence of various right-wing
political movements all over the globe has proven one of
the great surprises of late twentieth century life. It is
probably too imprecise to call them all fundamentalism.
Their social/ cultural/ theological contents are bewilderingly diverse. Yet a common theme can be seen. It
makes a formidable list: modernity with its enthronement of secularism, its reduction of politics to bureaucratic manipulation, its inability to ground basic human
values in anything other than self-serving materialism-if
not hedonism-the moral impotence of both communism and capitalism blatantly displayed. And I'm just getting started.
Some of us are more ready than others to judge
what Macintyre calls "the Enlightenment project" to have
failed. But there is no doubt that many voices across the
globe profoundly resent all attempts of religious communities to adjust their sights to accommodate modernity.
Resentment may be for some too weak a term. Rage is
more like it. The insistence is that all institutions of the
community, political, social, and academic must submit
to the rejection of modernity-excepting somehow only
the physical sciences and technology as though they are
not creatures of modernity themselves. I do not believe
that this is likely to be our problem here in Windhoek.
But we should not ignore the power of religion-both
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creative and destructive-in today's world. Religion can
become pathological; that is no reason to ignore it. Nor
should we wait until it becomes pathological before giving it our attention. That usually proves too late.
What is entailed in taking religion seriously in an
academic community? Historically there have been two
ways to do this. Classically, the study of religion has been
seen as a form of metaphysics, an investigation using
both philosophical and linguistic disciplines in the
attempt to propose and critique models of normativity.
Thus Thomism in the thirteenth century and German
Idealism in the nineteenth were brilliant achievements
seeking to integrate reason and faith.
In the nineteenth century, with the rapid development of the social sciences, an essentially different
approach to religion was proposed. Not normativity, but
descriptive analysis became definitive. How do phenomena manifest themselves? Does commitment to transcendent values provide stability for persons in crisis-or does
such commitment indicate the presence of neurosis? Is
the church a liberating or oppressive institution? Such
question are critically important and by no means essentially hostile to religion as such. However, such questions
cannot determine theological truth claims. Nor do they
adjudicate metaphysical affirmations offered by different
religions or confessions. It is interesting that the name
of this department seems to be open to both approaches.
We are free to speak of both theology and religion here.
It does not follow that all courses and research dealing
with religion are of interest only to this particular faculty.
We can speak of both religion and theology knowing full
well that there is no lack of academics who would seek to
suppress one or the other-and in extreme cases-both.
But our mandate is clear. Both theology and religion are
academically valid subjects for inquiry. How would this
work? Take theology, perhaps the more difficult case.
Theology has an undisguised interest in normativity.
What role can it play in a nation's, this nation's, future?
(Religion is the easy option. There seems to be little reason to believe that the people of Namibia will be particularly less religious in the future than they have been in
the past-although some social scientists might want to
debate that.) But to return to the harder case, what role
could theology play in a university that seeks to build for
a shared future?
Let me suggest how my particular discipline, theological ethics, could respond to this challenge. Morality,
of course, is not optional for any community, or for that
matter, any individual. Communities and persons may
disagree strongly as to the nature of morality and academicians may debate how ethical theory may best
account for the actual or proposed morality people display. That debate, of course, is to be encouraged. But
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morality itself is a component of our humanness and
while immorality is also in various ways an option, having
not morality at all, having no capacity or understanding
of good or evil, of right or wrong, moves us into a subhuman universe. The problem then is what kind of morality and, at one intellectual move beyond that, what sort of
ethics should a people encourage?
Non-theologians are often surprised to learn that
the major voices in the theological tradition, thinkers as
seminal as Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther both
agreed that moral behavior, and knowing right and
wrong, do not presuppose, or require, belief in
Christianity. Using very different methods, these voices
in classic theology argued that all people, by virtue of
being creatures of God, have some knowledge of moral
truth. Thomas thought that Aristotle was right in arguing that human beings have by nature some capacity for
fortitude and justice and prudence and moderation and,
what is more, all persons can be expected to be able to
grow in the exercise of such virtues. Now this is an
ancient teaching indeed, but who among us today would
not want to live in a community where such virtues are
present? Would you want to dispense with any of them
in your understanding of human moral behavior? Maybe
Thomas was wrong, but we cannot accuse him of being,
at the point, narrow-minded, of not recognizing the
moral dignity of persons, even quite apart from their
being touched by supernatural grace. Martin's logic is
more elusive, more complex. But he too believed that
the Creator had so written the divine law into the hearts
of all people that they all have some moral knowledge.
Now, having moral knowledge (e.g. an awareness of the
substance of the Ten Commandments) does not mean
that one actually lives according to the light that moral
knowledge gives. But the moral law-given by God-is
available to all.
For some seventy years now, this old tradition of
natural theology has been under severe attack by, of all
people, the theologians. I wish to cast my lot, however,
with Thomas and Martin. It is clear that both saw themselves as grounding their argument in Paul who, in turn,
believed himself to be following ample Old Testament
precedent. Now, theologians enjoy nothing so much as
to debate all these things. But my argument is fundamental and classical: ethics are possible apart from the
saving revelation of God in Christ and that therefore it is
possible for human beings generally, Christians or not, to
engage in significant moral discourse.
The recognition that at the end of this century we
find ourselves in a global society characterized by radical
pluralism is no barrier to moral affirmation and perhaps
even some measure of shared ethical understanding.
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Theologians do not need to restrict their address to persons already committed to the Christian faith-although
that particular strategy is, alas, pervasive today, especially
in Protestantism. The theological task, especially in a
university dedicated to serving all the people in its society, is to endeavor to speak understandably and with
salience to all. Sectarianism in theology, as in politics, is
to be avoided at almost all costs, especially today when it
flourishes among both fundamentalists and liberals-a
strategy I believe to be both unbiblical and dishonest.
Clearly our communities, institutions, and we ourselves can only live lives of value if we have access to the
moral sources of humanness. Whatever one thinks the
future of religions to be, it is clear that the future of our
moral quest, as our ethical debate, will become more difficult in the future, more urgent and more critical. Let
me give some examples of what I mean. The very brilliance of scientific advance in medical research, new
technologies and their associated therapies, have led to a
dramatic expansion of the study of medical ethics.
Science, as you have heard, is most reluctant to make
value judgements-or at least to acknowledge doing so.
But making value judgements is exactly what the practice
of medicine compels us to do. Science makes ethical
study increasingly, not less, urgent.
I am a member of the board of the Computer
Ethics Institute based in Washington, D.C. Most of our
people, unlike me, are well traveled in the world of
cyberspace and they report it's not always a pretty place
ethically. At a recent national conference a task force
presented what it called an up-date of the Ten
Commandments, not to suggest that Moses had become
obsolete, but, to the contrary, to indicate that the world
of computers too is a moral world and that implies moral
principles and that brings us back to Moses.
One of the most provocative and highly acclaimed
studies in political science to be published in the United
States in this decade is Glen Tinder's The Political
Meaning of Christianity. He finds the ancient and modern
human longing for liberty to be joined to the central aim
of social transformation, the creation of community.
And the basis of that he finds in what he calls "the exaltation of the individual" which he takes to be one of
Christianity's achievements. Now you may or may not be
heartened by any of these developments. What is striking, however, is the seeming increase in breakthoughs in
that wall erected by modernity in an effort to isolate religious life and spirituality generally from contaminating
the affairs of society.
That questions of value, of ethics, even of spirituality, are open to debate does not justify their exclusion
from academe. To the contrary, precisely because they
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are contested, often urgently so, they are particularly well
suited for communities which claim to be devoted to the
free exchange of ideas.
I would like to conclude these remarks by illustrating what I mean when I speak of the need for theological
studies-especially in their ethical mode-to participate
in the social tasks facing our communities. Globally and
locally, socially and personally, the moral search for justice has come to be recognized as indispensable and
foundational. Everyone wants to be treated justly; some
of us are even moved to demand it for others as well as
for ourselves. Consistency implies that each and all of us
want to be considered just and to live in societies which
embody justice.
Take an extreme example. Whatever the shortcomings of the communist movement in our century-and
there were many-it is important to note that much of
the undoubted appeal of communism lay not in its supposedly scientific materialism but rather in its message of
hope. The proletariat, so long denied justice, would, by
the historical inevitability of its victory over the bourgeoisie, enter into a time of justice for ali-or at least for
them. That dream turned out to be but a dream, if not a
nightmare, and is now itself a relic of history. But that
longing for justice-so cruelly deferred-was not an illusion. It was a secularized reaction to the apocalyptic
vision oflsrael's prophets: a day of judgement is coming
when the unjust will be cast down from their seats, and
the oppressed, the people of low degree, will enter into a
justice so long denied.
It is not so obvious that Western religious history
has been committed to justice. It may be an accident of
that history that one of its major concerns, the doctrine
of the justification of sinners, has usually been isolated
from the struggle for justice. It has seemed that religious
people have stressed justification while political people
have focused on justice. This apartheid betweenjustification and justice has proven both dangerous and influential. The English word, 'justice," is the equivalent for
what the Greeks (both in the Bible and out of it) called
dike. Its cognates in the Bible can mean an act of justice
or equity as well as the acceptance of one as being righteous or just. It is striking that in the New Testament
both justification (making us just) andjustice (doing, acting justly) are religiously grounded. Our religious communities today need to recapture the biblical vision of
continuity between a message of justification by grace
through faith and a divine justice affirming the dignity
and value of all people.
As for the non-religious interest in justice, that is to
be welcomed as an important opening for discourse even
while it is challenged to seek to clarify its basis. A con16

cern for justice that has no transcendent validation but
which has only (as is common in my country) an appeal
to what is currently socially approved proves to be a weak
reed indeed when faced with the powerful realities of
injustice. If the positivists are right, if justice is only that
which is socially approved, then even a Hitler can claim
to have been acting justly. If only the socially powerful
define the rule that articulate justice, then the oppression of the powerless continues unchallenged and, in
fact, is reinforced. Advocates for justice need to find a
basis more substantial than an appeal to what is merely
fashionable. How can theology help?
The biblical conviction is that justice is not merely a
social construct but has ontological dignity. The quality
of relationship between God and creation affirms our
fundamental reason for being. Justice is God's affirmation of all creatures as an expression of grace . Thus,
rather than opposing justice and justification, a global
theology will seek to relate them dialectically. Persons
whose relationships are radically affirmed learn that they
are empowered to be affirming themselves. Theological
ethics can help us see that the enduring motive for seeking justice is neither the revenge nor resentment so
much exercised in our time. Rather, justice is rooted in
the discovery that one's very existence is grounded in
grace.
The theological overcoming of the separation of
justice from justification leads to other reconsiderations.
The separation of justice and justification parallels the
contrast between justice and love. No one has seen this
problem more clearly in our century, I believe, than that
refugee from Nazi Germany, Paul Tillich. In his book,
Love, Power, and Justice and also in his magisterial
Systematic Theology he critiques the ways in which Western
culture has understood justice and its relation to the
other elements in the moral life. Justice is not an alternative to justification by grace or, in a word, divine love.
Furthermore, neither justice nor love is possible apart
from power. God is the ground from which power and
justice and love arise. Thus a justice without love would
be no justice at all for it would deny its own unity with
the supposed recipient of justice. Such a justice lacks the
power of healing that is needed when justice breaks
down. It is just this power which justification by grace
discloses, strengthening justice even as it transcends it.
Justice is the power of affirmation of the self and of the
group while love is the power of union, or reunion, or
separated selves. This means that the struggle for justice
requires the message of the justification of the godless,
the justification by grace, lest justice petrify into a structure of legalism or collapse into a mass of bureaucratic
regulations. This service to justice the religious message
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can perform.
Similarly, justification by grace without a connection to justice (the well known quietistic flight from the
world) is the ethical equivalent of the ancient gnostic
heresy and is itself ethically corrupt. Access to the mystery of knowing that one's people and one's self are
accepted by grace and are loved transcendently and eternally does not merely empower one for moral living
although that is its claim. More basically it alerts us to an
awareness that all persons are grounded in power and
justice and love, a conviction which even when grasped
only fragmentarily has repeatedly demonstrated its revolutionary power cross-culturally. Our problems then are
these: Can we be inclusive enough to include all three
aspects of our moral life-justice and power and love, as
the basis for critiquing our past and shaping our future?
And for us in the university, how can our study and
research, our moral reflection and action, resonate with
all three? Do we not see ourselves as empowered to be
lovers of truth and advocates for justice? Why not ask
theology to help us in this task?
It is, of course, controversial to require the modern
university, or any of its departments, to be an advocate
for justice. In some ways the university behaves likes its
mother, the church , and, like the church, some tell us, it
should be above politics. It should not sully itself in the
tough struggle for social justice. While this postition has
had distinguished and devout supporters in the past, the
history of our century has incontrovertibly shown its incoherence. In point of fact, the universities of Germany,
Italy, Spain and Japan were characteristically ardent supporters of their respective nations' adventures with fascism--even though that clearly compromised their own
academic integrity. Universities in communist nations
were, and are, totally absorbed by a state apparatus even
though that again, as in the case of their right wing opponents, compromises their academic credibility. In the
capitalist countries the record appears harder to assess.
Typically, however, the modern university is dominated
by a science often driven by technology, i.e., applied sciences which, of course, are driven by the demands of
industry (global and domestic) or by national political
policy, or by both. All this might suggest that the university really should be above politics or separate from the
social culture in which it is placed. But such detachment,
disengagement from one's context has proven again and
again to be sociologically impossible. Every community,
including the academic community, reflects the mores
and commitments and biases of its context.
The question then is not whether the modern university is involved in the struggle for justice characteristic
of its time and culture. It is rather, what role shall it
play? Since it is itself a major power structure in modern
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cultures, is it content merely to align itself with the other
power structures-certainly a natural possibility? Or, as
the liberationists would ask, does it have sufficient access
to self-transcendence so that it can serve in at least some
measure as an advocate for those large groups in its constituency that have limited access to power-the poor,
the marginalized, the aged, certainly children, and usually women? This is not likely to happen without some
intentionality. Or rather, it is not likely unless there is
structural provision for advocacy for the powerless within
the academic community. If this is not recognized, the
university will inevitably tend to see itself as merely an
agency for the powerful. One would like to think that all
students, all faculty, all administrators would seize such
advocacy as an obligation and an opportunity. Such idealism, however, frequently proves vacuous. But there is
in the university a discipline that is charged to deal with
the issue of ethics in general and thus with justice in particular.
In some places this is the work of philosophers, in
others theologians, and in still others, perhaps best of all,
of both. It is not a novelty to suggest that universities
have an academic responsibility to take issues of ethics
seriously. That has been assumed, if not always practiced, since universities were first invented. That there is
injustice in the world, we all know. It can be lethal. But
what then is justice? we continue to ask. Is the modern
university willing to encourage academics to do the difficult critical work needed to discern what justice is for us
now?
My first visit to Namibia was in 1976, when I was
invited by Dr. Zephania Kameeta to give some lectures
on social ethics. In the eighteen years since then you
have made dramatic, brilliant progress both in the articulation and the realization of justice for your people.
Where will we be in another eighteen years? Can this
momentum be sustained? I believe it is the responsibility
of the religious communities and their colleagues, the
theologians, to work to that end. If that sounds too
ambitious or diversionary, I ask you to consider the presupposition that lies behind it. In theology we have
learned from our Hebrew ancestors that ultimately we
are not what we are; we are what we are called to be.
Authentic existence (even of universities) is not stasis, it
is openness to the future. Accordingly an authentic university can never be content with what it is. Its identity is
found in the intensity and clarity and spirit of its commitment to what it is called to be. This it displays both in
the rigor of its search for truth and-as we have learned
at great cost-in its repudiation of the delusions of cultural disengagement in its continuing commitment to
freedom and justice for us all. 0
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Three Racially
Charged Words
Nandini Bhattacharya
It is apparent to everyone that
the world of academe is changing
rapidly around us. As we sit somewhat
catatonic amidst what appear to be
growing heaps of the rubble from
decades of policies and amendments
and re-amendments of those policies,
we feel the rub, the pressure, and on
rare occasions even a bracing push, to
engage with what has happened, is
happening, to our institutions of higher education. Sometimes I feel like
saying, as the environmentalist slogan
goes, Don't destroy or dismantle it, its the
only one we have got. Then I stop and
ask myself: Is that true? Or am I just
being a young dinosaur, blissfully
oblivious of the obliteration hanging
over my head?
Once upon a time, in a land
called New Jersey, in a campus town
called New Brunswick, there was a
president of a university who explicitly
compared himself to a ruler: "With
47,000 students, another 13,000 in faculty, staff, and administrators, this is
like running a city." ( CHE, Feb. 24,
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1995, A23). Well, this president spoke Lawrence, the beleaguered president
three magic words one day, three of Rutgers-a decision that might at
words that plunged his city into grief first glance seem like a treacherous
and conflict, into a nightmare of abandonment of my own roots and
infighting and name-calling and bull- identity as a minority university scholdozing of visions of multiculturalism. ar-is emblematic of the freezing and
Since then, the president has apolo- withering of speech and expression. I
gized, explained,and laid his record will attempt to dismantle or challenge
bare to any who care to see. But it such freezing and withering in this
seems like this time it is "off with his essay, following the lead of civil liberhead!"
tarians like Nadine Strossen and emiMaybe they won't be off with his nent race and cultural theorists like
head. However, if we return to 1995, it Henry Louis Gates.
Basically, the debate is one that
has already been a year of tumult and
temper, inside and outside of the emerges from the skirmishes of civil
classroom, and about who gets to say libertarians and critical race theorists,
what. The three magic words that the the conflict betwen the first and the
president of Rutgers used were fourteenth amendments, between the
"genetic hereditary background." conflicting demands of legal discourse
Faintly redolent of the pseudo-scien- upon free speech versus equal protectisms and phrenologies of the nine- tion. I believe, after some considerateenth century as that phrase might tion, that at universities we should not
be, the president has since repeatedly necessarily produce "speech, and
claimed that his record speaks for more speech," to paraphrase the
itself, that he cannot be seen as a words of Justice Brandeis, but that we
racist, that he has a history of affirma- are still on the edge of a new kind of
tive actions and policies that speak slippery slope of speech regulations,
more eloquently than words. one that the Rutgers incident clearly
Members of his own campus commu- exemplifies. Basically, I am all for pronity are divided in their view of his tecting the rights of "interpretive comunfortunate mis-speech, some minori- munities," but I do not believe that
ty personnel expressing their faith in rights can be protected by punishing
his intentions, while others have speech, expressions of dissent, or even
voiced a willingness to "make him the egregious and noxious errors of
litmus test for the next millenium" expression. As the old saying goes-a
(Rahman, CHE Feb. 24, 1995, A22). saying now popular among race theoIn my view, the furor over the presi- rists and lawyers, for example-"sticks
dent's famous (final?) words helps and stones can break my bones, but
focus the debates about political cor- words will never hurt me." Well, there
rectness and freedom of expression are a number of different schools of
that are rocking campuses across the thought on that, of course. Let me
summarize a few main ones, for our
nation.
For me, personally, the decision purposes.
One school of thought would
to engage with this issue, and to speak
in favor of protecting even the nefari- argue that words can indeed break
ous speech of a university president one' s bones; this is adduced, say, in
was a difficult one. Several times since charges of defamation, libel, or suits
I first felt a desire to write on the against intention to inflict emotional
topic-especially after I began read- pain. Rhetoricians of the position
ing who had what to say about regulat- argue that words are acts-speech
ing speech on campuses-! have acts-and to tolerate a racist expreswrung my hands and asked myself sion is necessarily to endorse it, even
why I took this upon myself. Perhaps realize it. Gates has called this the
the examination of my own authorial "Bickel principle" (Gates 39, 40). But,
motives and consciousness, and my to paraphrase Gates, it would be an
decision to speak on behalf of Francis absurd and dangerous distraction
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from coded speech to impute to words
the same force as actions. In fact,
such an emphasis on words draws
attention away from systemic ~ustice
and abuse. This then is the other
school of thought, that acknowledges
the power of inidividuals, even of representative individuals, to change
other lives by means of what they
utter, but considers it utterly misguided to imagine that an exclusive focus
upon words, to the neglect of deeds,
will in fact lead to less, rather than
more repression and suspicion.
Clearly it would seem that here is
an instance of how far a good idea can
be taken toward its own demise. I am
not in this to defend Francis Lawrence
as a champion of minorities. I do not
even think we can ever adequately
research and determine what exactly
will make a man or a woman impeccable in terms of their racial and cultural
politics. Finally, I do not believe that
we can say whether Lawrence acted in
good or bad faith. Instead, I hope we
can use the Lawrence incident to
rethink some issues such as freedom
of expression, the right to claim benefit of doubt in the current discursive
climate, and the very notion of a discursive public sphere, where out of
trial, error, and negotiation come
some fulfilling sense of striving.
The incident at Rutgers is important to me because it points to the way
in which contemporary discourse politics may have ushered in the end of
discourse, the foreclosure of the public sphere, and the withering of dialogue. The fault lies not simply with
the so-called "identity politicians"
though, with those who emphasize
rights over liberties in a civic community, who argue for the uniqueness of
specificities and for an available discourse upon rights activism, though
they too have sometime gone overboard, but with the sometimes blatant
manipulation of what is called a free
"marketplace of ideas," with a larger
crisis in the notions of exchange, dialogue, discourse, community. As one
writer, Richard Delgado, viewed the
crisis, resistance to speech implies a
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paradigm shift in many interpretive
communities, and often such shifts
threaten the current balance between
freedom and protection in communities. The blatant flouting of some
appeals and agitation in the past for
such paradigm shifts, I believe, have
indeed led to a larger crisis of faith, in
many cases justified. That is to say,
when minorities agitated during the
civil rights movement, they were
pushing the nation to shift the national paradigms on the interpretation of
rights and human dignity, and were
thereby ushering in a new interpretive community wherein previously
silenced views and interests participated in shaping social discourse.
Does the answer have to be the
disallowance and punishment of all
questionable speech? Can one forget
that speech regulations have a tendency to be applied with more regularity to the individuals they are
intended to protect? To cite only one
recent instance, Canada, which
recently
adopted
Catherine
MacKinnon's banning of pornography as the law of the land, immediately witnessed the raiding of a gay and
lesbian bookshop in Toronto, on
charges of obscenity (Gates 43; see
also Gates 25). Numerous similar
examples of anti-repression legislation turning around and chewing up
the still ridiculed or the stigmatized
could be cited. Moreover, as some
"minorities" see it, the notion of a
state that can simply step in and put a
protective screen around them every
time someone says something hurtful
reductively portrays the targets of
insults and assaults as always helpless
and too fragile to shrug and carry on.
Nadine Strossner cites at least two
examples of such a minority reaction:
protection incapacitates .... To think
that I [as a black man] will. ..be told
that white folks have the moral
character to shrug off insults, and I do
not. . .. That is the most insidious,
the most insulting, the most racist
statement of all! -Alan Keyes

and:
As a former student activist, and as a

current black militant, [I] [believe]
that free speech is the minority's
strongest weapon .... [Paternalism]
[and] censorship offer the college
student a tranquillizer as that antidote
to campus and societal racism ....
-Michael Meyers (Strossen 181, 182)

This goes right along with Gates'
reminder that "those who pit the First
Amendment against the Fourteenth
invite us to spend more time worrying
about speech codes than coded
speech" (47). We can lose our perspective on necessary political, social
and economic reform through a too
exclusive focus on speech reform.
Granted, many minorities victimized by speech are also systemically
disempowered and may not be able to
shake off or survive such assaults, but I
contend that those targeted individuals are worse served by poor housing,
lack of education, and an eviscerated
health care system than by hurtful
speech.
Instead of allowing dialogue, the
revolt at Rutgers is a prologue to a
renewal of the stonewalling and
silencing that minorities in this country resisted during the civil rights era.
The demonization and public dismemberment of Lawrence carries us
back to an older stage of public punishment, a kind of blood-lust for
revenge that can only be satisfied by a
spectacular beheading. Perhaps the
fault is not really of the people who
demand retribution. Perhaps the
problem is of an older, historical,
institutional nature. Public policy
seems to be geared toward an aU-ornothing format. Either we must burn
effigies, or we must fall down and worship them. Have we forgotten the old
saying about clay feet?
The question then is what can
we do with those clay feet?
Undoubtedly, the saying is often
intended to induce some self-reflexivity and flexibility about the shortcomings of others, to encourage us to look
down at our own feet and to notice
that they are necessarily dusty from
the long distances we have traveled in
the last several decades. The weapons
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with which public figures are beheaded must at least not be rusty. Well, in
a populace jostling with several million clay feet, kicking matches will
really hurt. Even if nobody's perfect,
and our feet are clayey, we don't have
to be all wood above the neck.
Paradigms of persecution in the
intellectual and cultural life of a society are, of course, nothing new.
Indeed, speech has never really been
free, has it? It has always come with a
price-tag attached. Socrates had to
answer to a tribunal that charged him
with corrupting youth, as did
Sophocles. The early Christians bore
and overcame intense persecution, as
did in a later age the Jews in midtwentieth century Europe. The
Reformation drove entire bodies of
knowledge and iconography scattering across Europe, and heresy has
always been a sword hanging over
many Christian cultures. I do not want
to make the theoretically hollow claim
that the tribulations of academe in
our age of less sanctioned barbarism
are parallel to persecutions in the past
such as the above. Neither can I compare academic conflicts to other, far
more serious acts of cleansing and
purging that the bulimic world seems
to be indulging in these days. But I
do want to stress the necessity of holding our ears close to the ground and
hearing the rumblings of fear and
malcontent such as there are in higher education today. All across the
board, money for the arts, for a liberal
humanist model of education is disappearing. The cry is for technology
above research, for application above
study, and on and on. In an era of
backlash and neo-conservatism, many
people are experiencing feelings of
persecution, of being herded into celllike isolation under unreasonable
scrutiny and accountability, and some
of those people align themselves with
left-liberal policies deeply affiliated
with or empathic to minority rights
discourses. In such an age, when some
of these axes are coming down on the
so-called excesses of the past decades,
how should our responsibilities be
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divided?
To me this is a vital personal
question, because I have always
thought of myself, at least to this
point, as a logical participant in discourses about minority identity discussions, and about minority rights
de bates. A diasporic alien resident
like me sometimes feels caught
between a crossfire of rights discourses, and as I write this piece, I cannot
but wonder if I am selling out to an
insistent demand in some quarters for
minorities and peddlers of "difference" to tone it down, to put a cork in
it. Surely, I used to think that my
responsibility would be to foster and
nurture discussions about the need to
hold individuals and institutions
accountable to some standard of sensitivity and awareness about issues of
multicultural politics, even though I
fmd it hard to fit into a given category
in the racial and cultural spectrum of
US diversity today.
Well, essentially I think that is
still the case. I have been talking to
myself for a long time about the
Lawrence issue as a result. The
upshot is that while I don't believe
that Lawrence's actual statement can
be condoned under any form or
guise, if we want to maintain a climate
of discourse we do need to separate a
record from a statement, a man from
a tasteless and frightening comment.
We need to stop finding effigies to
bum and scapegoats to sacrifice.
Basically, then, there is a need
to return to some standards of
accountability, of meaningful vigilance but not gun-point cultural politics. One of the charges brought
against Lawrence is that essentially his
actions and policies were instrumental in creating islands and ghettoes of
minority activity and development. As
the article in the Chronicle asserts,
"Walton R.Johnson, a professor of
Mrican studies, says officials must
learn that a program here and a cultural center there will not satisfy students" (A21). Fair enough. I can
resonate powerfully with the view that
tokenization and marginalization, the

unnecessary and forcible lumping
together of undifferentiated "minorities" is not a solution to the much
larger problem of wide societal misunderstanding and alienation. One cultural center doth not a culture save.
But what is the alternative? Either that
one makes no effort at all, or that one
actively neglects (strange but true
paradox) all efforts toward changing
the status quo, or worse, that one discourages any other form of minority
identity except a rabid assimilationism.
Discourse does form politics,
and vice-versa. Speech is important.
What people say, inadvertently or
deliberately, is crucial. Public officials
must be held accountable for the mistakes they make, the public errors
they are guilty of, the opportunities
they neglect for setting the record
straight, or for straightening the
record-making, etc. But the same public figures must also be allowed, like
everyone else, to withdraw statements
that they are apologetic about. Protest
can be strong, but not unyielding.
Because if there can be no renegotiation of one's position, or reformulation of one's views, there can be no
speech at all.
We need a real, working public
sphere, where negotiation and transactions are possible, where people can
continue to talk and have dialogue.
We need to affirm the validity of principles achieved as a result of long and
arduous national and minority struggles, and a history of centuries of
blood, sweat and tears. In such a public sphere, the bases of discourse can
continue to be remodelled and reaffirmed. In such a public sphere, many
voices can speak simultaneously and
with the assurance that others will listen, sympathetically and helpfully.
Some might complain that this is placing undue importance on talk, not
enough on action. I too find myself
fending off a paradox here. On the
one hand I have said that Lawrence's
actions deserve as much as attention,
if not more, than one misguided and
rotten public statement. On the other
The Cresset

hand, I seem to be stressing the value
of language, the act of communication (s), a coffee house of academia
where language buoys us up. The
paradox, however, exists only if we
determinedly and totally dissociate
words from acts, as much as if we see
all expression as direct and palpable
action. In the public sphere of free
and open exchange that I would like
to see preserved, rhetoric and ideology will or can create reality, not merely
in a causal sense, but in the sense that
our very production of words, texts,
and language is a part of our social
production. Without such production,
there will be a society of the merely
animate, in the place of beings who
come into being fully only in the symbolic ordering of desire that is language.
Students, as usual, are way
smarter than I in these things. The
other day, in one of my classrooms,
when a male student complained
about being silenced by feminist positions or discourse, a savvy female student responded: "Then let us talk
about it. Women like me want you to
respect us enough that you will tell us
what you think about us and what we
do." Negotiation and communicative
action birth new and viable identities.
Pragmatism is not a copout. Talk
is not everything, but it is not cheap.
Let us hope we'll be willing to pay the
cost. Q
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Does R*l*v*nce
Happen?
Maureen Jais-Mick
According to the CEOs of
industry, business is divided into
those who welcome change and those
who avoid it. The ones who are excited by change strike gold and become
pioneers; they found Microsoft. They
also go bankrupt trading in derivatives. Those who mistrust change
keep the best of tradition intact for
postery. They also fade along with
silent movies. Irrelevance equals
unemployment-as per the formerly
significant cultural icon Tiny Tim.
The traditions of sacred music
are manifold-chant, polyphony,
salsa, chorales, gospel, hymnody,
folksong, percussion, the blast of
organ and brass, the beat of drums.
Church musicians understand at least
parts of this tradition. Some woul?
charge that tradition is all we musicians understand. "Why don't we do
contemporary anthems? Doesn't he
know anything written in this
decade?" (This is often stated in close
proximity to "Why do we sing so
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many new hymns? What's wrong with
the old ones?"-so please pardon our
occasional confusion.)
I recall when musicians and pastors lived in fear of the word "relevant." Folks were clamoring for it.
"Give us contemporary worship!
Make it relevant!" We weren't sure of
the precise meaning, but we understood that, by implication, we were
irrelevant. Which brings to mind a
local UCC church currently studying
the age at which their children may
receive communion. During a recent
service the pastor said, ''I'm personally in favor of letting youngsters participate, but I appreciate that some of
you feel children should wait until
they understand the eucharist. That
makes sense. Which of you adults can
explain it?" Utter silence.
Anybody out there who can
explain "contemporary worship"? It
has a fluid definition. Some parishes
interpret it as any communion setting
not from the Lutheran Book of
Worship. Some interpret it as dialogue sermons and non-sexist language for prayers, hymns, and
scripture. Others use it to mean liturgical dance, story telling, folk musicians, or family choirs. At one parish I
visited it was defined as "the short service." Everyone I asked replied with a
variant of, "Oh, that's the good service-it's shorter than the eleven
o'clock."
As an itinerant musician who
serves many parishes, I'm intrigued
by how parishes see their worship. A
congregation I served last year had
three services-a 7:30 spoken communion, a 9:30 contemporary
eucharist (with family choir), and an
11:30 traditional eucharist (with vested choir). They were proud of this
worship diversity, but I couldn't see
much difference between the two
eucharists. The chancel was decorated the same, the hymns were the
same, the sermon was the same, the
pericopes were the same, and they
had the same worship folder. The
only items that changed were the
anthem, the presence or absence of
choir robes, and an increase in crying
babies at 9:30-which was generally
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as unexciting as the 11:30 "traditional" worship. Is it automatically "contemporary" if we use piano instead of
organ, doff choir robes, and import
crying infants? I hope not, else musicians, clergy, and worship planners
have been sweating over trivia.
"Relevance," as near as I can
define it, is the connection between a
person's worship life and their life
outside of church. It is manifested in
a variety of ways in worship. It is present when the laity compose the
Prayers of the People. (Sure, the pastor can probably do it quicker, but it's
not her job .) It can occur in lay
preaching, or when members write
hymns and plan services. Relevance
can be the ancient calm of Gregorian
chant, soothing after a hellish week,
or the rhythmic energy of Andre
Crouch, when we need to cut loose.
The "relevance" of your and my communities may not be identical.
"Relevance," I believe, also indicates a desire by parishioners to be
involved in worship . Linda Clark's
multi-year study of coherence in worship ("Music in Churches: Nourishing
Your Congregation's Musical Life,"
Washington, D.C.: The Alban
Institute, 1994) supports that belief.
Members of congregations large and
small, those led by professional musicians and those led by amateurs, had
in common the desire to be part of
the sacred music of their parish-and
not just in the traditional role of
choir members.
The hallowed traditions of
sacred music include the role of
(benevolent) dictator. These days ,
not even pastors can get away with
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autocratic behavior long-term
(though they can maintain it longer
than other staff members). Musicians
are now expected to draw people into
sacred music making; no more fiats.
Anton Armstrong, choral director at
St. Olaf College, says that every choir
needs a mission statement, one written cooperatively by the director and
members. Newcomers and oldtimers
alike need to understand their role as
sacred musicians and renew their
commitment. What could be more
relevant for a parish music program?
"But I don't understand this
style of music. I'm not good at working with children. Music for organ
and piano is tacky. Can't we get a volunteer to .. .?" How do we learn to
do things we don't know how to do?
Through training, of course . U.S.
Labor Secretary Robert Reich waxes
eloquent on the re-training of the
American workforce in order to
maintain a competitive edge in the
global marketplace. Church folks call
it continuing education, but it's the
same thing-our employer's investment in us and in the future of the
parish. A synod pastor explained to
me that his parish didn't provide
funds for its musician's continuing
education, because she is "only parttime." Mind you, this musician is the
organist, adult choir director, junior
choir director, bell choir director,
and assistant worship planner (some
part-time job, huh?)-the entire
music staff.
The amount of time she works
is irrelevant. What matters is that she
be equipped to do the best job possible. In this instance, it means being

capable as organist, working with
young, adult, and aging voices, directing bells, and planning liturgy.
Simply paying her dues for memberships in professional organizations in
the areas of organ, choral music,
handbells,and worship would average
$200 annually, not including occasional private study, workshops, conventions, music, and books. Want
multicultural music in your parish?
Excellent! Want your music ministry
to involve the community? Fabulous!
Want your organist to play gospel
piano? Sure! So, how much time and
money are you investing inthese
things? Yes, time and money. If you
provide continuing education funding, but expect the musician to
donate vacation time to use it, you're
cheating. And don't forget volunteer
musicians, if your parish is lucky
enough to have them. Provide them
with opportunities for workshops and
training, too.
Your parish will get the staff it
deserves. If you want fresh ideas and
creativity, allow staff the time to
learn, experiment, and dream. If you
want children involved in the life of
the parish, get young members to
rehearsals and worship. If you want a
staff that works well together, call a
senior pastor who knows how to
maintain team spirit. If you want competent staff, offer jobs that are interesting and compensated fairly.
And if you want "relevance,"
you'd better be prepared to get
involved. You can't buy it, and you
can't hire it. It's the work of the
entire parish. Relevance, unlike sh*t,
does not just happen. 0
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TV with the Best and
Brightest
Charles Vandersee

Dear Editor:
No hypothesis, so it wasn't an
experiment. But I did want clues.
What happens these days when superbright high school pupils face the
expanding temptation of our era,
network and cable TV? Here was the
chance: Ask them when they apply
for admission to the university in
Dogwood.
Seinfeld is their answer, the
obligatory show even for people who
hardly ever watch. Also, as one of
them told us, the big electronic box is
great for the household cat to rest on,
picking up good vibrations, purring
in his sleep, spreading a "mellow
euphoria" all through the room.
Then, poignantly, if you live in a
small town in the Shenandoah Valley,
where "the best orchestras and
Charles Vandersee is finishing the
semester with Bharati Mukherjee's novel
Jasmine, where in India too, "in the
towns, every little flat had a television set. "
He regularly writes for The Cresset.
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performances are usually the ones
that I am part of," TV gives you the
Chicago Symphony on occasion"allows me to be a part of the rest of
the world."
So this spring I know more than
I did a year ago. The admissions
office last summer asked if I'd suggest
a couple of questions for the
undergraduate application form,
being revised. I spend time in
admissions every year, reading files as
we choose mem hers of our
undergraduate scholars program.
Out of nowhere came the thought:
How do these overcommitted
achievers make their bargains with
the big bright box, Lucifer-inresidence? They can't possibly ignore
TV, but how do they handle it?
The question went in exactly as
I drafted it, as one of four options in
Part 9 of our interminable
application form: "Leaving aside its
obvious defects, how has television
benefited you personally in the last
three or four years?" Keep in mind
that "you" means people age 17 and
18 (occasionally 16) who are
simultaneously flutists, varsity soccer
players, class officers, science nerds,
people heading to Mexico on church
work trips and back from Model UN
at Harvard, also scoring 1400 on the
SAT.

The most striking responses
were the unpredictable. Clearly we
were right to keep the word personally;
it staved off vapid abstractions about
the public's sacred right to vegetate
and the networks' right to peddle
and prattle. Among a few dozen of
the responses observed, only one
piously mentioned C-SPAN.
Yet TV for some young people is
genuinely a source of enlightenment,
lux rather than Lucifer. One West
Coast applicant, for example, "rarely"
watches the regular stuff but puts the
VCR to shrewd competitive use:
"When trying out for school plays, it
generally benefits me to know as
much as possible about the

production before auditions begin.
By watching To Kill a Mockingbird I
was able to see how the author or
director wanted certain characters to
look, speak, dress and relate to other
characters. These are concepts that
are otherwise very difficult to
visualize."
Also carefully studying rather
than merely watching is an applicant
who explains:
"People often
underestimate the artistry required to
create an effective TV commercial.
In the brief span of about 30 seconds
a company must make a lasting
impression on its audience, who may
be only half listening, talking, or
looking in the refrigerator. I have
always loved critiquing commercials,
and may eventually choose to work in
the field of advertising. Therefore
television has benefited me by
showcasing both excellent and
uninspired commercials. In fact, I
sometimes tape my favorite ones."
An applicant from an academic
family relishes efforts to "combine
thoughtful art and social commentary
with a sense of the surreal": "The Kids
in the Hall, a five-man sketch comedy
troupe from Toronto, write and act
their strange short snippets, while The
Simpsons live in a world of drawing.
Both programs allude ingeniously to
literature, films, music, and history,
often making subversive cracks at
icons of politics or pop culture in the
process. In one Kids skit a man finds
himself stranded on a desert island
with Oscar Wilde; in another, Prince
Edward devises a phony tabloid
newspaper that fools the Queen into
believing
that
Canada
has
'abandoned the monarchy.' The
Simpsons even pokes fun at TV itself."
A small-town Virginia applicant tells
of relying on Star Trek for vocabulary
enrichment-words like anomaly,
entity, and polarity.
An applicant spending a
semester in Australia discovered that
"the CBS and NBC evening news
reruns were broadcast on Australian
23

tele [sic] two days after they were
aired in the US," and thereby kept in
touch with home. An "avid watcher
of nature programs" has found TV
shaping his future: "By seeing
biologists working in the field, and by
viewing the products of their
research, I have already formed
strong career goals of my own, and
hope to earn a graduate degree in
zoology." Not having TV in the house
for eight years has given a small-town
Virginian time to form the school's
first jazz band, and, through the
Internet, to receive and tape "more
than 200 hours of live Grateful Dead
performance with fellow devotees in
28 states, Canada, and England." An
applicant who does some teaching of
eight-year-olds watches the Mighty
Morphin Power Rangers because "the
adventures of these weirdly-clad
action heroes have provided me with
some clues to the psyche of the
average child today."
Perhaps the most problematic
response in this category of the
unexpected is from an African
American applicant who watched the
1991 "L.A. riots" from the "rural
plains" of a Southern state"screaming, 'Bum, baby, bum!' I was
happy that L.A. was going up in
flames . " "I was surprised at my
feelings," says the applicant, "and so
were my parents," who were angry but
not screaming, knowing that the
Rodney King incident was just one
more instance of racism. Three years
later, "I have come to the realization
that hate is not the answer to hate.
Awareness, respect, education, and
appreciation of other cultures are the
only ways to alleviate hatred . . . .
Instead of venting my anger by
screaming at the television, I have
learned to direct my anger into a
more positive channel."
We don't, of course, have the
details here-of how adolescent and
parents sorted out emotions
generated by a screen. But what
surprised me here and in some other
responses was TV bringing people
together. Isn't it supposed to be an
atomizing force, every "unit" of the
family having a separate screen in a
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separate
room,
and
never results are noticeable. I no longer
connecting? But television has growl at anyone who approaches me,
provided "a means of communication . . . After watching television, I leave
with my parents," says an Atlanta the room refreshed, rejuvenated, and
applicant. It "has become an initiator ready to face the world again." (Is
of discussion on topics ranging from this a new product idea, the madebaseball and football to religious and for-TV blanket, or has The Gap
moral issues. It has prevented the already got it?)
awkward silences around the dinner
The second of the main themes
table and in the den, and has offered has to do with the massive delusion of
a reason for my parents and I [sic] to being informed. Again, the brilliant
open up and sincerely converse with success of network execs in delivering
one another."
the exact required product:
Something similar from a New "Earthquakes, political coups,
York applicant: "Televised sporting invasions, the economy-the news is
events have also been a good excuse what attracts me to television. In 30
to get together with friends and/ or minutes I can be up-to-date on
family, and have been the backdrop national and international affairs."
for some of the best times I have ever
This particular enthusiast, from
experienced." From New Jersey, and a midsize Virginia city, happens to be
the high school lounge where seniors involved in TV, perhaps explaining
go during free periods: 'The girls in the delusion over what 30 minutes
fourth period Monday study are a can accomplish. The applicant talks
stressed-out bunch of overachievers, about an internship with the local
but we have somehow bonded over station, covering a story at a nearby
the merry music of the Ricki Lake college. With a staff reporter she
theme song."
drove there and "interviewed several
This is one of the two main people, including the president, the
themes in the current unscientific dean of admission, student leaders,
sampling: TV for escape, high school etc. Upon returning to the station, I
being "hectic and stressful," as one selected quotes that I wanted to use
applicant put it. "Times that I in my story, using them to structure
thought I might go crazy, I could the write-up of my story." The
turn on the Mighty Morphin Power account is charming-or chilling?Rangers. They always put life in in its ingenuous definition of TV
perspective with their bad acting and news: an effective packaging of the
humorous plots. For a little while the quotes that you happen to have and
pressures of everyday life belong to to like.
another world."
The word informed in two essays
Even in Florida, "very often at points possibly to the massive need
the end of a school week I feel for deconstructing that slippery term
mentally exhausted. Although I do in our delusion-ridden democracy.
enjoy leisure reading, it does require Just what does it take to be
concentration. Most television, "informed," in some reasonably
however, does not." From Virginia responsible sense of the word? What
suburbia, a vindication of TV worth do we make of glib sentences such as
framing for any network exec, in these, from two males: "The news
acclaim of a job well done: "Many and other informative shows such as
times after a period of intense focus 60 Minutes spark my interest in social
on academics and extracurricular issues and keep me informed about
activities, I am physically and world events." "I have benefited by
mentally drained. At those times I staying informed about current
find that an afternoon of television events through television. Television
["cartoons and sitcoms"] melts away is great because it allows me to know
my stress almost instantly. . . . I curl what is happening in our nation, as
up under a blanket in front of the well as in our world."
television. After 30 minutes the
Squarely challenging this
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delusion is an essay deserving to be
submitted to a class:
"The
development of my ability to evaluate
television programming, identifying
the hidden messages, underlying
biases, flawed logic, or cursory
presentations
benefits
me
tremendously. For example, news
programs often report about the
conflict between the Palestinians and
the Israelis. Whether a terrorist act or
an international peace treaty,
journalists play up the immediate
problem while ignoring the past.
Unfortunately, television rarely
provides in-depth explanations of the
historical roots of contemporary
crises. Such superficial coverage of
the protracted dispute over the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank and of the
complex relationships among the
countries of the Middle East hinders
the development of truly informed
opinions. This deficiency acts to
disassociate viewers from the
participants and their problems,
isolating them, and resulting in the
trivialization of the international
significance of the situation.
Television has given me an arena in
which to hone my analytical skills, . .

,

My sample suggests that indeed
immediacy triumphs over complexity,
as to what young people instinctively
claim to need. Several applicants
affirmed the power of image over
text, thus endorsing any number of
postmodern theorists and media
analysts. From a capital city in the
South, on the subject of the 1994
campaigns: "While I read newspapers
daily, television provided me with
glimpses, which newspapers cannot
convey, of candidates. By watching
campaign coverage on television , I
was able to see the different
personalities of the candidates, not
just their responses concerning
current issues. In newspapers I
simply read their answers. . . . A
candidate who consistently did not
appear confident in interviews or
presented himself poorly was not one
for whom I would plan to vote."
"When I read of genoc ide in
Bosnia and Croatia," writes a Virginia
May 1995

applicant, "it is often a simple task to
ignore it. It is substantially more
difficult to deny the existence of wars
in foreign lands when images of
human suffering haunt one's mind."
This candor from an applicant in a
good private school in the South: "I
am definitely a child of the visual aid
generation, and so oftentimes don't
get complete understanding of an
event without live video coverage or
'dramatized re-enactments.'"
At such wan imaginings one
does sometimes shriek, "Read, baby,
read." Especially when TV is held up
as source of knowledge that books
and magazines provide more quickly
and thoroughly. The soap opera As
the World Turns "introduces me to a
new set of ideas and circumstances
that I might otherwise not face.
Dealing with such issues as
schizophrenia, in vitro fertilization,
and AIDS, soap operas are ever on
the vanguard of social awareness."
When Ronald Reagan announced his
Alzheimer's, ATWThad already had a
character "for almost a year now, who
suffers from the same affliction.
Because of the portrayal of his actions
and the emotional impact of his
disease on his family and friends, I
can understand the difficulties facing
the Reagans and can empathize with
them."
There's no wrap-up coming at
you, I hasten to say-no suave
Koppelizing of these texts varying
from glib to discerning. Bright
American young people are not, as
far as I can see, either our saviors or
our downfall, regarding their
negotiations
with
Lucifer.
Encouraging is the occasional push
beyond such a banal binary. "I have
often conceived of the library in the
upstairs of my house as an angel
encouraging my intellect to soar in
sublime pursuits, and the television
in my basement as a devil tempting
me with indolent mindlessness,"
writes an applicant from his
"suburban cocoon," embarking on
self-interrogation. "But when I think
harder, I realize that television pulls
me outward, not downward .... to
the tensions of our nation's politics,

the tragedy of urban America, and
the tumult of a world rife with
conflict."
And I've excluded from this
hasty TV-like gathering of sound bites
most of the welcome examples of
non-sophomoric wit and humor.
'Television endows me," says a clearsighted and logophiliac maiden from
suburbia, "with a sense of humor,
sense of purpose, senslttvtty,
sensibilities, sensationalism, and
censorship. Above all, television has
made me an optimist; the world is
inhabited by beautiful people (and if
not beautiful, then profoundly
interesting). I am an informed
citizen of the world, and I know that
living vicariously through Tom
Brokaw and Heather Locklear is OK,
because everybody else does it too.
There are happy endings, my life will
never be boring, and After These
Messages, my friends will always be
Right Back."
Finally, from way far away, out
on the Western plains, comes further
vindication of the word personally in
the big question. His team won a
national championship quiz bowl
competition, and the victory ''was not
due completely to our having studied
hard in school and read on our own."
No, it happened that in the
quarterfinal round The Simpsons was
one of the choices for the 10question, one-minute bonus. "My
family watched the show religiously
and taped many of the episodes so we
could watch them later. [Our team]
did choose The Simpsons and
answered all ten correctly, earning
120 points in a very close match. I
earned $10,000 in scholarship money
from our team's victory; TV has
definitely benefited me personally."

From Dogwood, bemusedly yours,

c.v.
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on the world, Montaigne regarded us
as comic figures "capable of exciting
laughter," but refusing himself to
"endanger wisdom for fools."
No time or place has a special
claim on the ubiquity of human folly,
but in fin-de-siecle America we may
certainly point with pride to the more
egregious and bizarre forms of
contemporary culture to demonstrate
that we too live down to Montaigne's
skeptical-but not misanthropicexpectations. If we regard human
actions as the result of incomplete
and misguided knowledge rather
than moral or immoral intentions, we
understand that the largest category
of human imbecilities stem from
ignorance. Indeed, our knowledge of
the good and our knowledge of evil
are dwarfed by our knowledge of
ignorance. We need to understand
that ignorance is a form of knowledge, a
James Combs talent highly praised and rewarded in
our society. The exercise of human
knowing that admits and copes with
complexity,
ambiguity,
and
"I do not think," wrote Michel
contingency is regarded as suspect at
De Montaigne in his essay "On
best and subversive at worst. But the
Democritus and Heraclitus," ''we can
exercise of human ignorance that
ever be despised as much as we
flaunts prejudice, vulgarity, and base
deserve." The wise Montaigne does
emotions is celebrated as the height
not despair of human folly; he agrees
of wisdom. In fact, social ignorance is
with the "humour" of Democritus,
merely popular wisdom, rooted in
who found "the human state vain and
myth and folklore, convention and
ridiculous." We are not large enough
phraseology, story and rumor. Such
to be tragic, nor daring enough to
knowledge is a form of nescience, in
sustain great evil. In our smallness,
which a lack of knowledge, or
we may only be mocked as worthless.
knowledge limited by unreceptivity to
"There is, in my opinion," he
critical thought or multiple
continues, "not so much misery in us
perspectives, is deemed sufficiently
as emptiness, not so much malice as
ignorant as to serve us well.
folly. We are not so full of evil as of
Knowledge based in ignorance is
inanity, not so wretched as we are
thought superior to knowledge based
base." Following Diogenes, we are in
in enlightenment. Perhaps future
the main "flies or bladders puffed up
historians will name the present The
with wind" who are mostly "incapable
American Unenlightenment.
of doing either good or harm." The
What is truly astounding about
aristocrat withdrawn from but musing
the veil of ignorance that covers us is
the extent to which we value and
Jim Combs, who has written about
reward the display of our ignorant
popular culture for The Cresset for any
knowledge. One might think that
number of years, still finds the subject
compelling_ and is heavily published in the ignorance is something to be
ashamed of; but quite the contrary,
field. He keeps his word processor going in
we seem to flaunt it. Talk radio hosts,
rural Virginia.
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both urban and national, almost
universally and proudly display their
ignorance of truly knowledgeable
sources (say, social-scientific studies
of urban decay, or medical studies of
brain damage to poor children) and
their knowledge of popular
nescience.
The talk radio
bombasticator is often self-described
as an autodidact, self-taught in the
knowledge of ignorance, which is
usually fully shared by the ignorami
who call in to share their ignorance
with their fellow supplicants.
Ignorant knowledge is often intuitive,
visceral, and populist-"everybody
knows" that urban decay is the fault
of Them, and that poor children are
just dumb. Such "common sense" is
invariably
reductive,
usually
unempirical, and often merely smug.
Thirty years ago, an emiment
political scientist named Phillip
Converse published a famous article
entitled "The Nature of Belief
Systems in Mass Publics." He
purported to find an informed and
active minority who held stable
opinions, could articulate a forensic
social ideology, and sought
information about political and social
choices and trends. Outside of these
circles, Converse said, most people
held a jumble of ideas that was much
less informed and more random, less
articulate, and derived from "folk
ideologies," local talk, and mass
culture. The "Converse thesis" has
been hotly debated since, and we may
well wonder now if the distinction
between elite and mass thought is all
that sharp. Indeed, it may be the case
that elite thought is simply more
articulate and "middlebrow," but
shares with mass thought its
derivation from primal forms of
social ignorance. The motives for the
expression of elite ignorance may be
just as base or emotive, and the
argument as inane as that tossed
about
in
barbershops
and
hairdressers. We have every reason to
think that elites are not wiser, and
that the people who run things as
capable of fatuous or insubstantial
The Cresset

thought as everyone else.
Indeed, there exists an entire
industry available to elites that caters
to whatever form of know-nothingism
or silliness is fashionable at the
moment. The various "thinktanks"
are
peopled
by indentured
intellectuals who are highly paid to
produce social argumentation that
supports what the people in charge
wish to believe about the world, and
justify the pecking order that wisely
has people such as we at the top.
Such thinking also includes the
obsession that the people at the top
have about people on the bottom. In
order to allay guilt and avoid
responsibility, elite spokespersonssome would call them shills-bespeak
the justificatory litanies: the homeless
choose to be on the street, the
unemployed could find work if they
wanted to, the poor lack the qualities
so apparent in us and so absent in
them. The rich and mighty need
success and failure to be explained so
that the former can be properly
rewarded and the latter punished. It
is a matter, as Veblen might say, of
conspicuous dominance, finding
reasons expressed by intellectual
courtiers
that
justify
our
conspicuousness and dismisses their
inconspicuousness.
Charles Murray's notorious The
Bell Curoe is perhaps the most famous
recent example of nescience
masquerading
as
knowledge.
Professor Murray's motives and
conclusions are suspect, since he
labors in the vineyards of those who
wish to hear that the poor AfricanAmerican "underclass" is inherently
inferior, and therefore programs
designed to help them are a waste of
the wealth accumulated at the top.
Despite all the trappings of
psychometrics, critics chargecorrectly, I think-that all this is
pseudoscientific eyewash, stemming
from a desire to protect the
possessing classes from the claims of
the dispossessed. The framework,
symbolized by the mythical "bell
curve" of ancient psychology, has an
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emotive subtext that cannot be
stated: elite fear of the everexpanding ranks of the poor. The
"haves" wish to be free from
responsiblity for the plight of the
"have-nots," so an argument that says
their shameful condition is their own
fault is welcome and indeed
rewarded with semi-official sinecure.
Elites want to hear a voice that says
they are rich and powerful because of
talent and drive (even though many
of them got rich the old-fashioned
way: they either inherited it or stole
it). Lurking beneath the surface of
such nescience is the most irrational
of all fears, the desire for the
immutability of the class structure,
and the fear that the people on the
bottom hate us as much as we hate
them. Murray even conjurs up the
apocalyptic necessity for a "custodial
state" that will enforce the class
system, keeping Them away from Us.
The intellectual quest here, I suspect,
is not for the truth, but for truisms.
The truth about human intelligence
is various and complex, but truisms
about "racial inferiority" and "I.Q."
offer anxious elites simple and
graspable images of the way things
ought to be that conveniently
coincide with their own interest in
maintaining their privileged place in
the sun. (The American Enterprise
Institute is located in urban
Washington, where visitors and
"fellows" are whisked in and out by
cab or limousine; lower-class street
people and gangs populate and
control the streets not far away, just
as they do in many American city
neighborhoods; so in that case, who
is the custodian of whom?)
The articulation of truisms, then,
is rooted in the fallacy of wish, that
the magical incantations of language
can make the world to be as we wish
it. Murray even conjurs up a
nostalgic vision of small town and
neighborhood in a prelapsarian
America, before the fall into a world
dimmed by low intelligence.
Intelligence becomes a truistic
metaphor for what we need to

nourish, and stupidity what we need
to confine to custodial status. This
suggests a fear of contamination,
both social and genetic, rooted in
racial myths and the peculiar
American tradition of racial
separation and stigma. Racial
nescience is actually founded on the
conventional truisms of popular
romance-slaves were happy and
well-treated, voluntary acts of charity
and kindness allayed racism, black
people are good at certain skills
(cooking, singing, basketball), but
are not up to the requirements of the
higher intellectual skills, and so on.
Beneath every such romance is a
brutal truism about how unequal
social relations are justified and
maintained. In the past, the romance
was enforced by violence, segregation
laws, and exclusionary practices; now
a book of nescience will do. It should
be said that the same motive for
romantic social casting exists for
women.
A vast literature has
accumulated for a long time that
romanticizes women-the "pedestal"
myth, the male notion that they were
too delicate for the worlds of
business, politics, or sports, and so
on, all rooted in the nescience of
"female
intelligence"
(e.g.,
"intuition," emotional instability,
gender-specific skills).
The
expectation that girl students will do
poorly at mathematics or science still
exists in schools as a recrudescence of
a vast body of gender mythology. It
cannot be long until some denizen of
a right-wing thinktank produces a
gender equivalent of The Bell Curoe
that "proves" women belong in the
home, sewing circle, and garden club,
all supported by an impressive gaggle
of facto ids.
The mirror image of these kinds
of intellectual follies are those
African-American instructors-some
would call them propagandists-who
foment the doctrine of "black
superiority" and "Afrocentrism." The
anxiety behind this form of nescience
is clearly to shore up the self-esteem
of a people who have long gotten the
27

short end of the social stick. But in
the process of discovery, the African
past is romanticized as a kind of
Eden, and the presence of the dark
skin pigment melanin makes for
superior intellect and humaneness.
The ancient Egyptians-who were, we
learn, black-flew around in gliders
2000 years ago, and discovered the
principles of quantum mechanics.
Melanin stimulates healing through
movement, provides for paranormal
powers,
and
is
a
strong
electromagnetic force. And whales
speak French at the bottom of the
sea. Like Murray, such pseudoscience
and bogus history ignores the
universe of undermining factualities
that would disconfirm wished-for
abilities and histories. Whereas
Murray wants to prove black people
inferior to further an agenda, the
Afrocentrist teachers want to prove
black people superior for the same
ulterior reason. Both conjur up the
nescience of "intelligence" in order to
demonstrate their case, as if some
high score on an intelligence test
made you superior, successful, or
happy. (How many of us have gone
to a high school class reunion only to
discover, to our amazement, that
some quiet little mouse is now a Ph.D.
in chemistry, that the class clown and
C- student is a self-made millionaire,
and that the two plain morons who
dated throughout high school have
the happiest marriage and loveliest
children?)
Our anxiety about intelligence
occurs at a time when individualism
as a social value has been reasserted.
When the individual is told he or she
is on their own-that we are all
supposed to compete on that famous,
and totally nonexistent, "level playing
field"-people seek marks that
provide for reassurance. Evidence
that one is intelligent makes you feel
superior, gifted, and destined for
success. You can now self-administer
I.Q. tests, subscribe to American
spectator, join the Mensa Society, read
The Bell Curve. And you can look
down your nose at those poor
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wretches devoid of intelligence. If
you are black, you can associate
yourself with "identity politics" and
Afrocentrism; if you are white, you
can tell totally tasteless racial (and
gender) jokes. But what does the
individual do when racial tensions are
at the breaking point? And what do
we do as a society, and not merely as
individuals, when the demographics
change, and in many places the
majority is black, brown, red, or
yellow?
Many people worry about
intelligence because they sense that
the world is out of control, and no
one is smart enough to give it
direction. In a chaotic global
economy, "devolving" political
system, and explosive popular
culture, the exercise of social
intelligence seems hopelessly
inadequate. Thus we deprecate
social authorities as either not smart
enough "to get it," or as too
muddleheaded to be anything but
crackpot. At the moment, House
Speaker Gingrich both astounds and
repels many observers with his
audacious ramblings across an
inexhaustible range of topics,
arousing the suspicion-as happened
last year with President Clinton-that
elite intelligence is highly unstable
and frothy. We may be excused for
thinking that both Clinton and
Gingrich fancy themselves as
intellectuals, though their reading
consists of a great deal of nonsense
from pop managerial books (The
Seven Habits of Highly Effective People),
dubious gurus like Arianna
Huffington, and, professional pundits
and policywonks. This output is full
of pop truisms rather than verifiable
truths, making us fear that our
leaders mistake such ignorance for
wisdom and thus are running on
empty. Intellectual emptiness among
the powers that be does not inspire
confidence that the center can hold.
(It is fascinating to note how much
interest there is now in King Lear and
the Lear story: Jane Smiley adopts
the Lear tale to the Midwest in A

Thousand Acres; the Lear motif
appears in The Madness of King George;
and so on. Does Lear signify for us
the willful division of the realm into
warring tribes and regions; the
fragmentation of the American family
and community into irreconcilable
groups; the devolution of "family
values" into a Hobbesian nightmare
of greed, murder, and betrayal; and
the realization that those who rule us
are either mad or vacuous? Are we
creating the very conditions for our
national and social demise?
Remember, the true horror of Lear's
story is that he walks into the disaster
head on.)
If we cannot count on intelligence
to save us, then what can we do?
Well, the odd flip side of our concern
with intelligence is our celebration of
dumbness. We appear to find
ignorance both alarming and
charming, at once a threat and a
hope. The Charles Murrays can
wring their hands over the alleged
dumbness at the bottom, and the
public fret over dumbness at the top.
But the popular culture has found
that dumbness sells. TV's The
Simpsons (Marge and Homer, not the
Othello and Desdemona of
Brentwood), Roseanne, Married, with
Children, the wide range of humiliatethe-bizarre-guests talk shows, tabloid
news, and so on all evidence the mass
appeal of imbecility. So too the
movies: Wayne's World, The Beverly
Hillbillies, The Brady Bunch, Dumb and
Dumber, Billy Madison, Tommy Bo-r
the list seems to be endless. The
Academy honored the most elaborate
celebration of dopey virtue, Forrest
Gump, and it was indeed academy art:
the horror of our recent past is
endurable if you are a without-a-clue
dope who walks through it like a
somnambulist, and you are richly
rewarded if you understand none of
it. The dumb, not the meek, inherit
the earth. Ignorance is not only bliss,
it is the key to survival. In a world of
pure chance, where intelligence
doesn ' t make a difference, you are
better off sleepwalking through
The Cresset

history and counting on your
halfWitted innocuousness to pull you
through.
There is a puzzling social polarity
going on here, as if we can't decide
whether it is better to be smart or
dumb. We fear dumbness, but do not
trust intelligence; the dumbed down
become cultural heroes, yet we call
for the spread of intelligence.
Dumbness is associated both with
innocence and grossness, and
intelligence with both guile and
mastery. As usual, Americans are not
quite sure what they want to be, and
are anxious about what we are
becoming. We do run the risk of
confusing simplicity with simplemindedness, intellect with mercurial
puzzlement. Above all, what I think
we should try to avoid is rewarding
bad behavior, including both
intellectual arrogance and stupid and
foolish actions. And here a dose of
the humility and skepticism
Montaigne recommended wouldn't
be bad for us. Intelligence is not a
quotient along a curve, it is an
activity; smart is as smart does. And
ignorance is equally willful: dumb is
as dumb does. Everyone is capable of
the use of pragmatic intelligence that
produces fruitful results, and equally
capable of the use of ignorance that
produces fruitless results. Both as
individuals and a society, we are worse
off if we exalt ignorance into a social
norm and behavioral habit to be
honored and practiced in defiance of
the better angels of our natures. If we
dishonor wisdom, we will do unwise
things and produce unwise results.
Now that's simple enough for
everyone to grasp, right? We shall
soon see if we can avoid the social
inanition that flows from the
cultivation of ignorance. The force of
ignorance is great and may be
irresistible, since intellect is so fragile
and fearsome. Orwell may have had
it right: ignorance is strength. 0

May 1995

a white barge captain who admitted
throwing three black stowaways
overboard is found not guilty of
homicide by an all-white jury. Jurors
defend their decision explaining that
no proof exists the victims actually
died.
But racial animosity, of course,
runs in both directions. Black jurors
return not-guilty verdicts for the
black rioters who beat white truck
driver Reginald Denney. In her race
for a seat on the Louisiana Supreme
Court, black candidate Bernette
Johnson dismisses white candidate
Miriam Waltzer's life-long advocacy
for and activity in civil rights as a "lie"
because Waltzer had the gall to run
for office in a black majority district.
Dr. King dreamt of a world where
race doesn't matter, but the fact is
that race matters very much, today,
perhaps more than ever.
Years ago, radical Baptist
preacher and civil rights activist Will
Fredrick Barton D. Campbell rather disingenuously
explained his urgency in achieving
racial justice by saying that he
In his famous "I Have a Dream" wanted white people to even up with
speech in 1963, Dr. Martin Luther black people before black people
King, Jr., specified that his hopes for gave up on white people. Whether or
racial justice and equality included not it's fair to say that black people
those that "my four little children have given up on white people, it's
will one day live in a nation where certainly true that contemporary
they will not be judged by the color American society simmers with black
of their skin but by the content of anger. Two recent films illustrate
their character."
Sadly, daily manifestations of this rage: Spike
newspaper headlines remind us that Lee's Malcolm X, available on video,
in the 90s we remain at least as and Stephen Gyllenhaal's Losing
obsessed by skin color as we were Isaiah, now playing the nation's
three decades ago. The Los Angeles movie theaters.
policemen who were video-taped
beating Rodney King are found not
guilty by an all-white jury. A month
Malcolm X forthrightly invokes
ago in my hometown of New Orleans,
the Rodney King incident in its
opening. An American flag flutters
in the breeze, and behind it we see
Novelist and critic Fredrick Barton is scenes of the horrific beating King
the film columnist for the newsweekly endures by a gang of Los Angeles
Gambit and teaches at the University of policemen. The flag ignites and
New Orleans where he is Professor of flames down into the shape of an X ..
English and Associate Dean of Liberal The message is clear: the America of
Arts. His most recent novel With the 90s still burns with racial hostility.
Extreme Prejudice (Villard/Random And the proper response to that
House)
deals
extensively
with racial enmity lies in the life story and
contemporary race relations.
teachings of a charismatic black
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leader who died three decades ago. I younger brother Reginald, Malcolm
couldn't agree more with the converted to the then-little-known
premise of this opening. There are teachings of Elijah Muhammad and
sundry lessons to be learned from joined the Nation of Islam. Equally
the fascinating, mercurial life important, Malcolm began an
Malcolm X lived from his birth in incredibly rigorous program of self1925 till his death less than 40 years education, copying the entire
later. And many of those lessons are dictionary in long hand to improve
captured in this fervently-made, his vocabulary, devoting himself to a
brilliantly-acted film. In the final regimen of reading that exhausted
analysis, though, the Malcolm X the non-fiction collection in the
depicted in the frames of this movie is prison library and resulted in the
a man less inspiring than the one horn-rimmed glasses which became
who emerges in the pages of The his trademark.
Autobiography of Malcolm X upon
Malcolm was released from
which the film is based. The movie prison in 1952 and devoted the next
Malcolm has been spiked with the decade of his life to working for the
filmmaker's own angry vision, and in Nation of Islam, ultimately as its
so doing Lee has robbed his story of Harlem-based "National Minister."
what should have been a knockout Under his leadership the Nation of
emotional punch for a much larger Islam grew from about 400 when he
and more mixed-race audience.
joined to about 40,000 by 1963. The
Malcolm Little was the seventh Nation of Islam taught that Allah
child of a black preacher who was had selected Elijah Muhammad as his
murdered by a white racist mob. earthly spokesman, that black people
Malcolm's mother never recovered were the first and chosen children of
from her husband's death and finally God and that "devil" whites were
through the genetic
had to be institutionalized. Thus, created
Malcolm grew up in a series of foster engineering of a mad scientist named
homes in and around East Lansing, Mr. Yacub. Replacing his "slave
Michigan. He was a bright child, name," Little, with an X, Malcolm
regularly earning the highest marks preached this racist gospel for eleven
in his class, and he was popular years, adding to it his own aggressive
enough with his mostly white concern about the economic, social
schoolmates that they elected him and political subjugation of
president of his seventh grade class. America's black multitudes. While
In the eighth grade, though, Malcolm Martin Luther King invoked
ran into the high wall ofwhite racism Christian courage and a strategy of
when an adored English teacher told civil disobedience in his efforts to
him that his ambition to be a lawyer overturn Jim Crow laws in the nascent
was unrealistic "for a nigger." cities and hamlets of the South,
Devastated, Malcolm dropped out of Malcolm X encouraged racial pride,
school and moved to live with a sister self-help and a defiant posture of
in Boston. He drifted through a series self-defense in the Northern urban
of menial jobs, spending all of his ghettos. As early as 1961 Malcolm
money on fancy zoot suits and "conk" began to grow frustrated by Elijah
treatments to straighten his kinky Muhammad's reluctance to allow the
reddish hair. After a time he became Nation of Islam a more active role in
a stereotypical street hustler, running the civil rights movement. Not long
numbers, pimping, selling and using later, Malcolm suffered a major crisis
dope. Eventually, he ran a burglary of faith when he discovered
ring. Finally, he was arrested and Muhammad's sexual transgressions
sentenced to 10 years in prison. He with two young secretaries. Finally
Muhammad "silenced" his National
was 21 years old.
In prison Malcolm was so bitter Minister and in 1964 banished him.
and violent the other inmates called Malcolm responded by forming an
him Satan. But encouraged by his Islamic organization of his own.
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Freed from the ideological trappings
of the Nation of Islam, Malcolm
immediately showed a more open
attitude toward whites, and after a
pilgrimage to Mecca declared his
belief in interracial
human
brotherhood. Infuriated, three of his
former Black Muslim brothers
gunned him down during a 1965
speech.
Spike Lee's film depicts most of
these events, some slightly altered for
the sake of narrative smoothness.
The scene in Malcolm's eighth-grade
classroom needs a little more
preparation and breathing space to
achieve the heartbreak it attains in
the book. Eliminating Malcolm's
siblings as characters was probably
necessary for reasons of time, but the
disappearance of Reginald, who
recruited Malcolm for the Nation of
Islam and broke with Muhammad
years before Malcolm did, robs the
film of one of The Autobiography's
most ironic and wrenching passages.
The film captures the jazzy allure of
Lindyhopping black nightlife in the
1940s with terrific energy and style. In
terms of production values Malcolm X
is sheer visual majesty. Best of all,
Malcolm
X establishes
its
protagonist's incredible charisma, his
righteous anger, indelible charm and
depth of compassion. The gifted
Denzel
Washington's
lead
performance is mesmerizing and
unforgettable.
Where Malcolm X falls short is in
Lee's refusal to let the Malcolm of
1964-65 really show the extent to
which his heart had grown to
embrace people of whatever racial
stripe. The picture acknowledges this
final change by including a speech in
which Malcolm says, "In the past I
have indicted white people who did
not deserve it." But the film doesn't
give the change nearly the emphasis
that Malcolm himself gives it in his
autobiography. Two omissions
illustrate my point. During his career
with the Nation of Islam, Malcolm
was approached by a white girl after
a speech on her Ivy League campus.
She was deeply moved and asked
Malcolm what could she do to help.
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Coldly, Malcolm stared her down
and told her in a single word:
"Nothing." Lee includes this scene in
his movie, and it elicited whoops and
applause in the audience with which
I saw the film. In the closing pages of
his book, however, Malcolm recalls
that incident with regret. He says he
wishes he knew the girl's name and
her phone number or her address so
he could call or write to apologize
and tell her that indeed there were
things she could do to help.
Comparably, Lee draws Malcolm
X to a close with Nelson Mandela
standing in a South Mrica classroom
reading one of Malcolm's speeches.
Mandela refused to read the speech's
fiery end, however, and Lee cuts to
documentary footage of an angry
Malcolm declaring his intent to
achieve human rights for black
people "by any means necessary." In
contrast, days before his death
Malcolm reflected on the "sickness
and madness" of his days with the
Nation oflslam and said, "I'm glad to
be free of them. It's time for martyrs
now. And if I'm to be one, it will be
in the cause of brotherhood. That's
the only thing that can save this
country. I've learned it the hard way,
but I've learned it." This, to me, is
the ultimate lesson of Malcolm X.
Many in this country have not yet
learned it. I am sad to say that the
movie Malcolm X makes me wonder if
Spike Lee is one of them.
THE COLOR OF LOVE

Stephen Gyllenhaal's harrowing
Losing Isaiah takes up the issue of
interracial relationships in the most
direct of ways. The film tells the story
of a contemporary white couple who
adopt a black baby and the
subsequent efforts of the baby's black
biological mother to set the adoption
aside. Gyllenhaal and screenwriter
Naomi Foner are to be credited for
both their courage and balance in
approaching this volatile issue.
Acknowledging that the film will
likely elicit "big polarities in
filmgoers' responses," Gyllenhaal has
said that he hopes Losing Isaiah will
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Social worker Margaret Lewin (Jessica Lange) cares for and adopts a newborn baby in
Losing Isaiah. Photo by Richard Foreman. Copyright © 1995 by Paramount Pictures.

open "a positive dialogue." I wish I
could share his hopes. The film is
effectively provocative, but as I live
longer in this race-divided nation, I
grow pessimistic that we're any
longer willing to listen to each other.
Jessica Lange stars in Losing
Isaiah as Chicago social worker
Margaret Lewin. In the hospital
where she works, Margaret comes
across a three-day-old black infant,
stubbornly clinging to life despite the
crack addiction he inherited from
his strung-out mother. The mother,
Khaila Richards (Halle Berry),

abandons the child in a garbage heap
to go stumbling off in pursuit of
another rock for her crack pipe. The
baby barely escapes being crushed by
a garbage-truck compactor before
being rushed to the hospital.
The film tries to fudge on the
next set of events. Khaila is arrested
for shoplifting, and by the time she
comes out of her drug fog, sh.e
presumes that her baby is dead.
Margaret, meanwhile, uses maternity
hospital fingerprint records to
identify the baby as Isaiah Richards.
Responding to Isaiah's fierce
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struggle for life, Margaret and her
husband Charles (David Strathairn)
begin adoption procedures. But after
Isaiah is identified, the picture offers
no explanation for why Khaila is not
charged with felony abandonment.
Moreover, given that the mother's
identity is known, the film stumbles
seriously in having the courts
approve the Lewins' adoption without
in any way addressing the fact that
Isaiah's mother is alive (and for that
matter under detention by the state).
Of course, both of these narrat.ive
glitches are crucial to what follows.
Khaila gets out of jail, enters
drug counseling, gets a job as a
housekeeper . (another glitch I'm
afraid- how likely is it that a middleclass family is going to turn daily care
of their infant over to a woman who
left her own baby in a garbage
heap?) and strives to put her life back
together. In the suburbs, Margaret
and Charles provide Isaiah
(marvelously played by young Marc
John Jeffries) a loving home, and he
grows to age four as a boisterously
happy youngster. But then Khaila
finds out that Isaiah is alive and
arranges with black activist attorney
Kadar Lewis (Samuel L. Jackson) to
file suit to overturn the adoption and
return Isaiah to her custody.
The proceedings of the trial are
pure torture. Its strategies are as
contemptible as a modern political
campaign. Fairness is nothing;
winning is all. Lewis makes a big
point that the Lewins have failed to
read Isaiah stories by AfricanAmerican authors and have failed to
provide him dolls with specifically
African-American features. Lewis is
unmoved that the Lewins haven't
provided the child with Anglofeatured dolls either. Lewis argues
that, "You might raise a black child
with the best intentions in the world.
But in the end the world is still out
there, and he needs to know who he
is." This position is taken directly
from that of the National Association
of Black Social Workers who have
decried the practice of cross-racial
adoption as "cui tural genocide."
Boiled down, this principle translates:
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race matters. White adults are not fit
parents for black children precisely
because they are white. And outside
the frame of this movie, 43 states now
bar interracial
adoptions.
Meanwhile, a recent Newsweek article
estimates that 67% of the children
waiting for adoption are black and
that minority youngsters languish in
foster homes twice as long as white
children. In life, as in Losing Isaiah,
the principle that race matters in
adoptive parenting is being spouted
by angry black adults and paid for by
thousands of helpless black children.
Losing Isaiah in tends to be
healing. It illustrates the powerful
strides Khaila makes in trying to
redeem herself. It shows her as a
positive and caring influence on her
young niece and nephew and as a
responsible caregiver for the child of
her employers. The Lewins are
deeply wounded by Khaila's attempt
to take Isaiah away from them, but at
some level they acknowledge the
fundamental nature of her maternal
quest. The film's determined evenhandedness, however, is finally a kind
of weakness. The film's concluding
suggestion that Margaret and Khaila
need to join hands and care for
Isaiah together is wonderful as a
metaphor. If indeed we are finally to
overcome, it must be through the
joined efforts of black and white
together. But what succeeds as
metaphor fails as narrative. Margaret
and Khaila can both be influences
on Isaiah's life; both can love and
nurture and guide him. But only one
can possess the authority of Mother.
By suggesting otherwise, the film
sacrifices good sense on the altar of
political correctness. The story would
have had stronger emotional grip
and greater moral clout had it relied
on the biblical tale of Solomon and
the babe with two mothers. We would
have more enduring confidence in
Khaila's fitness for motherhood had
she renounced her claim rather than
pressed it so aggressively.
Moreover, by suggesting that
the Lewins are incidentally blind to
Isaiah's need to be conscious and
proud of his blackness, Losing Isaiah

leaves the impression that perhaps
indeed white parents cannot raise a
black child ''who knows who he is." I
absolutely do not believe this. And I
am deeply troubled that four
centuries of white racism have left
intelligent black people so angry and
frustrated as to promote such an idea.
The reverse, that a black adult is not
a fit parent for a white child precisely
because he is black, would be quickly
condemned as racist by thinking
people of whatever color. What we
need in this world are more
interracial relationships, not fewer,
more interracial families, not
impediments to those few already in
place. As we seek to redress an
historical pattern of wrongs, we must
be very, very careful that our
appropriate recent emphasis on
cultural diversity not become an
excuse, even a clarion call for
continued and reinvigorated
segregation.
In closing, I am reminded of
the most haunting passage from
Richard Attenborough's Gandhi. An
Hindu man comes to Gandhi to make
an excruciating confession. In his
furor during the religious wars which
have followed India's independence
from Great Britain, the Hindu has
brutally slain an innocent Moslem
boy. Now "I am in Hell," he tells the
great Mahatma. But Gandhi calls
him close and tells him: "I know a way
out of hell. Find an orphan Moslem
boy and take him into your house.
Feed him and clothe him and raise
him as your own son. Love him as
your own son. And raise him as a
Moslem." That's where I think we
find ourselves across the widening
racial divide of the 1990s. Love
knows no color. And if a white adult
can't raise a black child (and vice
versa) to "know who he is," then
Martin Luther King's challenge to see
character over color was mindless
palaver. And we are all in hell. And
there is no way out. 0
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Books for a Long
Time
Stephen D. O ' Leary. Arguing the
Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennia[
Rhetoric.
New York:
Oxford
University Press, 1994.
Stephen D. O'Leary's, Arguing
the Apocalypse: A Theory of M illennia[
Rhetoric, is a sophisticated rhetorical
analysis of apocalyptic discourse as
argument. Beginning wi t h the
observation that previous studies of
apocalyptic writings do not account
for their persuasive power in public
settings, O'Leary constructs a critical
method from a variety of theoretical
components that allows him to do just
that. The result is a helpful survey of
the history of apocalyptic discourse,
as well as more detailed studies of the
rhetoric of the Millerite movement of
the 1840s and the end-times vision of
Hal Lindsey in the 1970s and 80s.
In doing his critical work,
O'Leary borrows from classical topoi
systems, as well as from recent
rhetorical concepts including
Kenneth Burke's theory of form and
John Campbell's analysis of rhetorical
constructions of time . O'Leary also
draws on theorists writing outside the
rhetorical tradition, for instance, Max
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Weber and his theory of authority.
Central to much of O'Leary's analysis
is Burke's notion of the comic and
tragic frames for interpreting
rhetorical action. O'Leary argues
that apocalyptic rhetoric persuades
by manipulating the topoi of time,
authority, and evil. Moreover, such
rhetoric often shifts the rhetorical
frame from the comic to the tragic as
the disappointed hope accompanying
failed efforts at social reform gives
way to ominous visions of the end in
which the just are rewarded and the
evil punished. O'Leary's assessment
is itself persuasive on such points,
and he supports his case with a
careful and adept reading of relevant
documents.
In his assessment of the
argumentative efforts of William
Miller, O'Leary points up the great
dialectical skill Miller developed in
defending his timetable for the end
of the world. O'Leary is detached
and objective in his treatment of
Miller, whom he tends to see as an
earnest but wrong-headed exegete.
As a result of Miller's rhetorical skill
at manipulating the topoi of time, evil
and authority, the Millerite
movement was extraordinarily
successful. For this reason, its failure
after the Great Disappointment of
1843 had a chilling effect on all endtime preaching for most of a century.
O 'Leary's analysis of the movement's
rhetoric is sound, and the emphasis is
kept where it should be in a
rhetorical study-on the public
discourse itself.
The rhetoric of this text is itself
intriguing; as O'Leary's relationship
to his object of study changes, so
changes his method and tone .
Whereas William Miller is earnest and
misguided, Hal Lindsey emerges
from the pages of this book as a
calculating and manipulative liar
entangled in a troubling and
unconscionable conspiracy to hijack
American politics and foreign policy.
The method of analysis in the
chapters on Lindsey is also less
burdened by the critical mechanisms
developed in the book's opening
chapters. Rather, O'Leary turns to a

freer and more entertaining narrative
approach which relates a fascinating
story featuring characters like Ronald
Reagan, Pat Robertson, and Casper
Weinberger engaged in a ludicrous
effort to construct American foreign
and domestic policy around the
enormously popular and half-baked
apocalyptic predictions of Lindsey
himself. Lindsey is willing to conceal,
contrive, and confuse on his way to
preparing his public to back
legislation that will advance an ultraconservative agenda. Lindsey is
presented as a Reagan operative, and
a successful one at that. This part of
the book is engaging and troubling
reading, and it is also solid rhetorical
analysis of an important episode in
American religious and political
history. One is left wondering
whether the Late Great Planet Earth
phenomenon could have occurred in
any other country of the world, or
whether it required the peculiar
religio-political soil of American
history to take root.
At points in the text I
questioned whether O'Leary's
analysis benefitted in depth of insight
proportionately to the complexity of
his critical framework. The Weberian
I Burkeian I Aristotelian I
Campbellian
method
leads
sometimes to obfuscatory conclusions
that sound suspiciously like
rhetoricians' jargon. For instance,
"By combining this topos of
eschatology with the topos of time,
apocalyptic rhetoric constructs its
present and immediate future in
terms of an imminent divine
response to the ultimate exigence."
(p.33)
This tendency is less
pronounced in the discussion of
Lindsey, where O'Leary's passionate
loathing takes the wheel. The writing
becomes more engaging, the critical
insights more accessible, the
historical implications more striking.
Perhaps the complexity of a critic's
method is indirectly proportional to
his or her passion for the object of
criticism. The book closes with an
overly long conclusion, and a
thoughtful musing on the incident in
Waco.
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For anyone interested in
eschatology, or in the history of
religion in America, this is a
worthwhile work. Rhetorical scholars
should welcome another good
historical study that draws heavily on
the American tradition of rhetorical
theory and criticism. Finally, the
section on Lindsey and his influence
will hold the attention of readers who
are simply interested in recent
American political developments. If
O'Leary is right about Lindsey, there
was more to the conservative turn of
the 80s than met the media-focused
eye.
James Herrick

John Thompson. Modern Trinitarian
Perspectives.
New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994.
In this nicely conceived but
poorly edited study, John Thompson
pulls together some of the main
themes in the twenty-year-long
renaissance of trinity studies that
goes back to, say, the publication of
Jurgen Moltmann's The Crucified God
and of his The Trinity and the Kingdom.
During this renaissance a remarkable
burst of theology from Reformed,
Lutheran, Catholic, Anglican,
Orthodox, and Methodist trinitarians
has revitalized the doctrine of the
Trinity and restored to it some of its
prestige as a premiere doctrine of the
Christian faith and as an organizing
principle of Christian theology. In
these ways the recent renewal follows
the lead of Karl Barth, a mighty,
massive,
and
exasperating
trinitarian-probably, as Huck Finn
might have put it, the splendidest and
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orneriest trinity theorist in all of
modernity.
Relatively brief, mostly
descriptive and irenic, inevitably
wide and shallow rather than narrow
and deep, Thompson's survey
attempts to show us who's who and
what's what in the many-splendored
world of contemporary trinitarianism.
In an excellent plan, the author
examines the hookup between the
doctrine of the Trinity and such
other doctrines as the doctrine of
salvation, including eschatological
salvation (Karl Rahner, Eberhard
Jungel, Jurgen Moltmann, Wolfhart
Pannenberg, Barth, Hans Urs von
Balthasar); the doctrine of Christ's
obedient suffering, including his
humiliating abandonment by the
Father (Barth , Moltmann, von
Balthasar); the doctrine of the
immage of God (Barth); and, in a
strong and unusual chapter, the
doctrines of church and missions
(Barth, Moltmann, Lesslie Newbigin,
Thomas Torrance,
Grigorios
Larentzakis,John Zizioulas).
Thompson moreover explores
the relationship of the doctrine of
the Trinity to Christian worship
Qohn J. O'Donnell, Walter Kasper,
Geoffrey Wainwright); to politics and
society (Moltmann, Larentzakis,
Barth, Kasper, Leonardo Boff); to
feminism
(Susan
Brooks
Thistlethwaite); and to both atheism
and natural theism (Barth, Kasper).
As one can see from these lists
of names, Karl Barth shows up more
often than anybody, and almost more
often than not. His role in this book
is to settle disputes, break ties, and
generally to put things back into a
proper Barthian perspective-a role
that readers may find reassuring or
disconcerting depending on their
own theological orientation. In
either case they will note that
Professor Thompson, the author of
Christ iu Perspective in the Theolog;y of
Karl Barth (Edinburgh: 1978) , does
sometimes criticize as well as laud
Barth, and that he generally handles
Barth's trinitarian opponents, such as
Moltmann, with disciplined fairness.
The same is true of his treatment of
the theology of the many other

figures in this book.
All along, Thompson keeps his
topics firmly in place, brings to them
the contributions of a host of
theologians,
discusses
these
contributions in a hospitable spirit,
and inobtrusively mixes in his own
judgments and conclusions.
Indeed, so finessed is the
author's mixing that it sometimes
obscures the book's point of view. In
certain passages the reader has to
stop and try to figure out whether
Thompson is merely reporting a
theologian's assertion, or whether he
is advocating it, or whether he is
characterizing a secondary source's
judgment on that theologian, or
whether something else is going on.
Take as an example the following
paragraph.
Just preceding it
Thompson discusses Karl Rahner's
proposal to call the three persons in
God "three distinct manners of
subsisting" instead. Then this (p.
132):
In a critique of Rahner, Kasper
believes that this way of speaking may
be technically correct theologically
but is kerygmatically not meaningful
in fact, even unintelligible as a kind of
code language [footnote to Kasper].
Moreover, is "distinct manner of
subsisting" usable in doxology, the
language of praise and worship? Even
Rahner's view can have at heart a trace
of modalism-though this is untrue
both of Raimer and of Barth. What is
needed is not abandonment of the
traditional language of person but its
reinterpretation [footnote to Kasper].
But this was in fact what Rahner was
seeking to do, though neither he nor
Barth can find a single word that can
be a substitute for the rejected word
'person.' In turn, Kasper comments
that the whole question is more one of
content than of language but language
is expressive of a certain content and
both must go together.
While we are in the complaint
department, I should add that
Oxford University Press has done an
annoyingly poor job of editing this
book. Use of "the Patristics" for the
church fathers; overuse of the passive
voice, especially in such vague
constructions as "it is generally
granted that ... " and "it is argued
that ... "; multiple appearances of
The Cresset

demonstrative and impersonal
pronouns without clear antecedents
("Neither view is valid. In the first
place, it is based on .... "); confusing
alternation in use of "the Trinity" for
the Holy Trinity and for the doctrine
of the Trinity-these and other
unhappinesses should have been
caught by an alert editor. Further,
this book contains too many
sentences like the following (p. 78):
"Positively, since God as Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit is a being in a
community of personal relationships,
the fact of personal encounter with
others can prove invaluable, especially
if it acts, as God has done, in the
greatest humility and love." A fact
acts? And in humility and love?
It's a pity that Modern Trinitarian
Perspectives is marred in these ways,

given that in so many other ways it is a Notes on Poetsworthy offering. The author has
conceived the fine project of Terry Fugate is an M. Div. candidate
displaying some of the riches of at Lutheran Theological Seminary in
contemporary trinitarian theology. Columbia, South Carolina. His essays
He has moreover devised a revealing and poems have appeared in First
and useful chapter plan, and has kept
Things, The Poetry Miscellany, Sequoya
control of a host of topics and figures.
Review and others.
He also respects and wants to
preserve the great conciliar tradition
of trinitarian dogma, while at the Gary Fincke teaches creative writing
same time welcoming the genuine at Susquehanna University in
insights of contemporary theology. Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania. He has
And he is fair-by no means a routine several books of poetry.
virtue of people who write books of
this kind.
Thus, two cheers and a hope:
How about a thoroughly edited
second edition?
Cornelius Plantinga, Jr.

The Scents of Sanctity
The saints, sometimes, had scents of sanctity.
St. Francis of Paul smelled always like musk;
St. Cajetan, bloom of the orange tree,
The virgin's fragrance. And kind St. Lydwine,
We're told, carried the kitchen aromas
Of ginger, cinnamon, clove, approaching
Like a holiday ham, more specific
Than St. John of Copertino, who smelled
Simply wonderful, unlike anything
But delightful, according to the saved.
Though we know now these were the sainthood scents
Of odd medicines or advanced disease,
St. Catherine of Ricci exuding
Her doctor's prescription of turpentine,
As aromatic as the pure of heart;
St. Teresa of Avila oozing
The sour apple smell of diabetes.
And now we bathe or shower, repeating
Our morning promises to diet, love,
And sinlessness, wondering at odors
We find on ourselves. Which counseled choice
Will spice our blood of hazards? Which disease
Will signal the saint in its sugared self?
Between us and death are sweet scents we hope
Spiral down our drains with water and soap.

Gary Fincke
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